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Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine:
Some New Reflections on
White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process
Eugene Cerruti'

[The White Queen:]Forinstance, now, ... there's the King's Messenger He's in prison
now, being punished:and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of
course the crime comes last of all.
[A/ice:] Suppose he nevercommits the crime?
[The White Queen:] That would be all the better,wouldn't it?
-Lewis

Carroll,Through the Looking-Glass2

THE due process doctrine of Brady v. Maryland3 is commonly viewed
as simply another of our troubled rules of constitutional criminal procedure: well intentioned but utterly bedeviled in its details. The Brady
doctrine purports to inscribe as constitutional law the seemingly self-evident proposition that a public prosecutor, charged with the fair pursuit of
criminal justice, should provide the criminal defendant with any material
in the state's possession which tends to exculpate the accused of the state's
charges. But Brady wears a mask, for it has never actually required the prosecutor to do what is so manifestly the right thing to do. The failure of the
rule is hardly a mere matter of detail. The Brady rule fails because it is at
I Professor of Law, New York Law School. This article has benefited from the institutional support of New York Law School, the critical support of a faculty forum, and the particular
support of Stephen Ellmann and Stacy Caplow. I would also like to extend many thanks to
Lindsay Bender and Tamara Sorokanich for their excellent research assistance in the foreign
and international fields.
2 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 89
(Bloomsbury 2001) (1872).

3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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bottom grounded in a deeply rooted adversarial pathology unique to the
American criminal justice system. It fails because it was never, or at least
not for longer than a moment, designed to succeed.
Brady has always benefitted from its iconic status as one of the Warren Court's earliest and most idealistic restatements of the unique and
exalted demands placed upon our nation's prosecutors in their pursuit of
adversarial criminal justice. 4 The doctrine has become emblematic of the
broad notion that our prosecutors must wear two hats in their joint pursuit of the competitive demands of advocacy and the neutral commands
of justice.' To be sure, many of our nation's prosecutors do just that. But
in many respects, particularly with respect to the disclosure of exculpatory material to the defendant, many prosecutors are clearly failing to meet
the challenge. This Article will demonstrate that the many failings of our
nation's prosecutors, most of them clearly unethical in nature, are not best
understood as individualized deviations from an idealized norm of criminal
justice. Rather, they are better understood as conditioned responses which
emanate from a fundamentally skewed normative order within our criminal
justice system.
Starting with the premise of an exceptional constitutional system of
criminal justice which provides the criminal defendant in America with an
extraordinary array of constitutional privileges and protections, our courts
over the years have responded reflexively in creating a reciprocal network
of privileges for the American prosecutor, ostensibly designed to level or at
least maintain some balance on the adversarial playing field. As a result, the
American prosecutor is now presented with fewer demands for transparency and fair play than in almost any other mature legal system, whether
civil, common, or international law. In.the most recent era, the most no4 See Scott E. Sundby, Essay, Fallen Superheroes and ConstitutionalMirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643, 643-44 (2002).

5
The U.S. attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), overruledon othergrounds by Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212 (196o).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,53 (1992) (prosecutor seeking indictment
has absolutely no obligation under federal law to reveal to the grand jury even substantially
exculpatory evidence); id. at 64 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (protesting the above holding due
to the fact that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice do impose such an ethical obligation);
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867-69 (1982) (government may deprive
defendant of access to witnesses by deporting them, absent "plausible showing" by defendant
that the testimony of the uninterviewed witnesses would satisfy the Brady standard of mate-
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torious example of these endemic tendencies towards sheltering critical
information and denying fair access to the criminal defendant is found in
the typical refusal of prosecutors to consent to the simple examination of
available DNA material in cases where the defendant has earlier been convicted without any forensic testing having taken place and is ultimately
exonerated by such evidence.7 Still, the Brady doctrine remains both the
iconic and ironic example of this deeply embedded tendency within our
legal system to provide informational privileges designed to create exceptional adversarial protection or advantage to the prosecutor. Contrary to
common impression,' what will be demonstrated here is that the Supreme
Court's confused yet deliberate unfolding of the Brady doctrine has effectively settled upon the same dictate as that of the White Queen: the trial
must come first, and the disclosure of exculpatory evidence must come
only after a conviction, if at all.
The Brady doctrine is indeed something of a stark anomaly in constitutional criminal procedure. This entire field of procedural rights is typically overseen by the doctrine of "harmless" error in which prosecutorial
errors will be excused if they are deemed harmless to the outcome of the
case. 9 But the Brady doctrine has created something that surpasses even
this broad doctrine of prosecutorial excuse. It might better be described
as a novel doctrine of harmless conviction, for the Supreme Court has now
made it perfectly clear that when a prosecutor operating within our competitive adversarial system fails both deliberately and unethically to disriality); Roviaro v.United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-66 (1957) (recognizing qualified "informant's
privilege" which permits prosecutor to withhold identity of confidential informant unless defendant can demonstrate a material need for disclosure); Jencks v.United States, 353 U.S. 657,
665-70 (1957) (permitting prosecutor to withhold from the defendant the prior statements
of a government witness until after the witness has testified on direct), superseded by statute
by The Jencks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (aooo)) (codifying the
holding inJencks), extendedby FED. R.CRIM. P. 26.2 (extending Jencks rule to prior statements of
defense witnesses). Perhaps the outer limits of the government's power to deny timely access
to critical information was best expressed recently when a court denied a federal prosecutor's
exceptional motion to preclude the City of New York from interviewing its own employees regarding a ferry accident for which another of its employees had already been indicted, on the
ground that the city intended to share the information gained with counsel for the indicted
employee. See Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, White-Collar Crime; Government Attempts
to Shield Its Witnesses From the Defense, N.Y.L.J., Feb. I, 2005, at 3.
7 "In nearly half the sixty-four exonerations, local prosecutors refused to release crime
evidence for DNA tests until litigation was threatened or filed." BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED

xvi (2000).

8 "It's a cornerstone of all democracies that criminal defendants get access to potentially
exculpatory evidence." Editorial, Missing Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A14.
9 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. i8, 23-25 (1967); see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper,
Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme Court's Harmless Constitutional
Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309 (2002) (criticizing the application of the harmless error
doctrine to constitutional criminal procedure).
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close exculpatory material to the criminal defendant at the trial court level,
it is not in itself even deemed to be error. It becomes error only when a
reviewing court concludes that the nondisclosure of its own accord has produced a wrongful conviction at trial.
Nor is this doctrinal abyss one of limited consequence. It reveals yet
another example of how the Supreme Court's adherence to an exceptional
and essentially false theory of the adversarial system of justice has produced a due process doctrine of laissez-faire measures that serves only to
shield the lowest standards of professional behavior. The Supreme Court
has adopted a view of the adversarial system as an essentially self-regulating market for the production of truth that is best left to its own resources.
It is now broadly recognized that the Supreme Court's current expression
of the Sixth Amendment standard for the effective assistance of defense
counsel tolerates an abysmally low level of professional representation."
As shall be seen, the Supreme Court's Brady doctrine does much the same
for our nation's prosecutors. As now constructed, the doctrine does nothing to elevate the constitutional standard for what are otherwise ethically
compelled disclosures but rather has lowered that standard to a level of
nondisclosure that would not be tolerated of public prosecutors in virtually
any other mature system of law, either national or international. The fact
that our nation's prosecutors do not routinely fall to the levels tolerated by
these minimalist standards spares only the lawyers, not the doctrine itself.
The Brady doctrine has nonetheless lived a relatively charmed life in
the otherwise caustic community of scholarly critics of our constitutional
criminal procedure. The Fourth Amendment, of course, gets no respect,"
but even the attacks on that amendment have not gone so far as to suggest
that the Fourth Amendment has abandoned its avowed constitutional mission and reverted to something quite the opposite, such as a safe haven for
police misconduct. This is in fact what has happened to the Brady doctrine.
Brady purports to be a constitutional rule of pretrial discovery by the criminal defendant, but it is not. In its present construction it not only does not
affirmatively require any pretrial discovery of exculpatory information, it
effectively discourages it. Rather than operating as a substantive doctrine
of due process to the defendant, Brady now functions more as a surrogate
12

i See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
I I See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (holding that the proper standard by which to measure an attorney's effectiveness is "simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms"); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counselforthe Poor: The Death Sentence Not
forthe Worst Crime butfor the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
12 See Sundby, supra note 4, at 643 (referring to Brady as one of a small pantheon of
Supreme Court cases to have achieved "superhero status").
13 See, e.g., Daniel McKenzie, What Were They Smoking?: The Supreme Court' LatestStep in a
Long, Strange Tip Through the Fourth Amendment: Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (zooi), 93
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 153 (2OOZ).
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doctrine of due compensation to the prosecution. The Brady doctrine, at
least at the Supreme Court level, has become a rule of adversarial privilege for prosecutorial nondisclosure of the very information it purports to
require disclosed.
The principle of transparency in criminal justice, even adversarial criminal justice, has quite recently entered a new era in both foreign
and international systems of law. The 199os are now cast as the "decade
of disclosure" with regard to the sudden emergence and almost universal
recognition of human rights principles of exculpatory disclosures by the
prosecution.' 4 The preeminent Brady doctrine has therefore been rather
abruptly transformed into an ironic outcast in the emerging global regime
of criminal justice.
This emergence of a foreign and international law of exculpatory disclosure provides both an opportunity and a challenge to review the Brady
doctrine in an entirely new context. Until now, the doctrine has typically
been considered a sui generis byproduct of the uniquely American constitutional system of adversarial due process. This premise of American exceptionalism has served to shield the doctrine from the ultimate reductions
of the typical complaints, found in both the academic literature and the
lower court cases, that the doctrine constructed by the Supreme Court fails
to declare a rule of disclosure that is either principled or intelligible. Once
one accepts the first premise of the adversarial philosophy enunciated and
relied upon rather insistently by the Court, namely that due process in
our competitive, adversarial system requires an accommodation of certain
measured privileges for the prosecutor-as-adversary to countervail the constitutional advantages provided to the criminal defendant, one is consequently restricted in the ability to declare that the various accommodations
recognized in the Brady case law are simply wrong.' Wrong not merely as a
matter of construction or detail but wrong as a matter of first principle.
This Article therefore attempts to seize this timely opportunity to develop a baseline critique of the Brady doctrine both from within and without.

14 See generally JOHN ARNOLD Epp, BUILDING ON THE DECADE OF DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (200!).

15 For example, two early and quite excellent reviews of the Brady doctrine each provided a penetrating critique of the failings of the doctrine itself, followed by a somewhat lame
conclusion as to what should be done to redress the problem. See Barbara Allen Babcock,
FairPlay: Evidence Favorableto an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1133 (i98I-82) (suggesting that the solution to the weaknesses of the Brady doctrine might
be found in the Supreme Court's raising of the Sixth Amendment standard of effective assistance of counsel); Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems
of ProsecutorialDiscretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391 (1984) (suggesting that the most effective, although extraordinarily expensive, solution to the failures of the
Brady doctrine would be to provide all defendants with a per se right to an in camera review
by the trial judge of the entire prosecution file to determine whether there was any exculpatory material to be disclosed).
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It will first identify the core doctrinal malignancy that lies at the heart of
the Supreme Court's rulings, and it will then demonstrate how the doctrine
has now effectively been repudiated by the emerging regimes of human
rights law in other adversarial systems, both foreign and international.
Part I will review the abrupt rise and fall of the Brady doctrine as a promise of a more equitable and transparent system of justice. This is already
an oft-told tale, ' yet the purpose of this section will be to identify not the
many twists, turns, and failures of the case law, but rather the central and
durable defect in the doctrine itself: an unmediated and atavistic commitment to an adversarial process in which any pretrial disclosure of evidence
to the accused is viewed as a threat to the essential balance and integrity of
that process. For several hundred years there was virtually no discovery by
the criminal defendant and likewise a deep-seated commitment to keeping things that way. By the late i95os, things had progressed only to the
point where several very limited criminal discovery statutes, most notably
Rule I6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, had been passed, and
a number of appellate courts had recognized that trial courts did have at
least some inherent power to order limited discovery in a criminal case.
Still, there was no constitutional rule of discovery and no rule at all requiring disclosure of exculpatory material. Brady v. Maryland, decided in 1963,
was therefore the first Supreme Court ruling in both respects. Despite the
transparent beneficence of its holding, the Brady rule contravened some of
the most deeply grounded instincts of the judicial monitors of the criminal
process. At ground level, the case was not well received by either prosecutors or judges. The judicial reaction to its precepts set in almost immediately, particularly at the level of the post-Warren Supreme Court. Not long
after Brady began percolating new law in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court set out on a steady pursuit of retrenchment with regard to the very
tolerance of the adversarial process to such constitutionally guaranteed discovery by the criminal defendant.
Part II will reveal how differently the matter of prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory material has been handled in other nations which, like
the United States, rely upon an adversarial system of criminal justice. The
discussion here will focus on the extraordinary story of the recent and still
unfolding developments in the English "Brady law." England discovered
somewhat rudely, as was the case much earlier in America, that its public
prosecutors could not always be trusted to play fairly and openly in pursuit
of a major conviction. The response to this crisis of injustice by both the
English courts and Parliament provides a sharp and seemingly provocative
contrast to our own high court's inability to raise the floorboards of our
criminal justice system. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada, without
the benefit of a national scandal to prod it, has also recently made a major

16 See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 4.
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and transformative contribution to the law of exculpatory disclosures in
that nation.
Part III will then demonstrate how the newly formed and highly regarded international tribunals of criminal justice have likewise created a "Brady
law" that far surpasses our own. The affair of prosecutorial nondisclosures
that created a crisis of confidence in the English criminal justice system,
commonly referred to as the "miscarriages of justice" scandal, reverberated throughout Europe and the international community, even though
not at all in the American legal theater. At the outset of the 199os, there
was no rule of exculpatory disclosure within the entire corpus of international rules, covenants and protocols. Yet by the end of that decade, there
were three new venues of international criminal justice-the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the long-sought International Criminal Court
(ICC)-each of which had introduced a rule or article creating an affirmative duty of disclosure of exculpatory material by the prosecution.
Thus, adversarial criminal justice, both foreign and international, has
firmly endorsed principles of fairness and transparency that remain explicitly rejected within the Supreme Court's Brady doctrine. The doctrine has
recently become yet another instance of how the American position "now
stands alone" within the rapidly evolving global standards of fundamental
justice." Therefore, the concluding call of this article is for the Supreme
Court to reposition its Brady doctrine to conform both to inherent principles of contemporary due process as well as to recently settled standards
of international human rights.

I. THE RISE

AND FALL OF BDYM: THE FOUNDING

ERA OF No DISCOVERY

The Brady rule, as a constitutional rule of criminal discovery, perhaps never really had much of a chance. It was the odd progeny of a long-standing, deeply entrenched judicial philosophy of adversarial laissez-faire that
viewed all criminal discovery as a serious threat to the essential, yet delicate, balance of adversaries in the criminal justice system. Even as the
courts have become more accustomed to legislatively imposed discovery
in criminal cases, the opposition to compelled disclosure of exculpatory
material-a highly sensitive subject matter never covered by any of the
statutory rules of discovery-has remained virulent within the adversarial
culture of the criminal justice system. To fully appreciate the dramatic rise

17 "In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577
(2005).
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and fall of the Brady rule, it is necessary to recollect and reexamine its very
reluctant beginnings.
Until well into the last century, there was virtually no discovery by a defendant in a criminal case. There was therefore nothing exceptional about
the fact that there was no discovery by the defendant of specifically exculpatory material. The various legislatures had not passed criminal discovery
statutes, the courts deemed themselves without inherent power to order
discovery in a criminal case, and the very idea of discovery by a criminal defendant was almost universally regarded as a radical threat to the adversarial
system of justice. What is remarkable here is not that times have changed
and our attitudes and laws regarding criminal discovery have entered a new
era, but rather that our laws and attitudes in this singular area of the state's
obligation to provide the defendant with exculpatory information appear to
have changed so little.
As shall be seen in the discussion of the actual case law, the Brady doctrine has been riddled almost from the outset with a seemingly unrequited
urge to return to the earlier adversarial paradigm. While the Brady doctrine
of today has been popularized as a constitutional rule of discovery designed
to prevent a defendant from being denied information that might prevent
the injustice of a wrongful conviction, the original doctrinal basis for Brady
had little to do with discovery as such. The underlying doctrine was in fact
but a narrow set of rulings designed to admonish only some of the most
egregious forms of prosecutorial corruption which, in turn, had very little to
do with a mere denial of discovery.
Criminal discovery in the common law era was indeed something of a
legal oxymoron. Apart from a few isolated and exceptional cases, 8 there
was no criminal discovery, constitutional or otherwise. On the civil side, expanding rules of discovery had been unfolding since the early nineteenth
century and had been met with almost universal acceptance.' 9 However,
the success of the civil discovery movement had little spillover to the criminal side. Criminal discovery was routinely referred to as a separate "problem" and a rather insoluble one at that.20
Why was criminal discovery deemed to be such a distinct and intransigent problem? There were various reasons given, but three are worth noting. First of all, unlike civil discovery where there was at least an argument
to be made that discovery benefited both sides to the litigation more or

18 See generallyPeople ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 156 N.E. 84 (N.Y. 1927) (reviewing
the early rule and collecting cases).
19 "[I]t is generally agreed that discovery, as a complement to modern liberal pleading,
has improved the operation and administration of our judicial system and has advanced the
purposes it was designed to serve." Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV.
940, 942 (196i).
20 See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. OF THE ALl AND THE ABA, THE
PROBLEM OF DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES (1961).
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less equally, it was clear that on the criminal side only the defendant would
benefit substantially from rules of discovery that provided him with access
to the other side's files] Secondly, even if the defendant was considered to
have information of interest to the prosecutor, the general understanding
at the time was that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would prevent the prosecutor from compelling meaningful discovery
from the defendant. 2 2 Thirdly and most perniciously, there was the rather
open mistrust and disdain for the lower-tier practices of the criminal defense bar whose members would, according to the prevailing view, stop at
nothing to get their man off:
Often district attorneys are willing to open up their files for inspection by
defendant's counsel, when the latter is considered trustworthy in the sense
that he would not be a party to subornation of perjury or an illegally fabricated defense. But they feel that some counsel, especially those who habitually appear for professional criminals, will stop at nothing to get their man
discharged, and that discovery will only facilitate such anti-social designs.23
The problem with discovery by the criminal defendant was, therefore,
that it was deemed to be an essentially unfair adversarial burden to impose upon the inherently disadvantaged public prosecutor. What followed
from this recognition of a structural handicap imposed on the prosecutor
by the Constitution was a well-settled belief that the matter of discovery
by the criminal defendant was a matter most appropriately resolved by the
exercise of prosecutorial prerogative. The Supreme Court maintained this
posture of deference to prosecutorial discretion until well into the 195os.
In Lelandv. Oregon, decided in 1952, the Court stated that although it was
indeed the "better practice" to grant discovery to the criminal defendant

21

We should first observe that the prosecution in the usual criminal case is
well supplied with evidentiary material. It is the state, not the defense,
which first exerts force in the gathering of evidence and in bringing it
under exclusive control. Moreover, with the improvements in detection
apparatus and methods of modern police organization and operation, the
state is much better at fact gathering.

Robert L. Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State CriminalCases, i2

STAN.

L.

REV. 293,

305 (1959-

6o).
22 "In considering the problem [of criminal discovery] it must be remembered that in
view of the defendant's constitutional and statutory protections against self-incrimination, the
State has no right whatsoever to demand an inspection of any of his documents or to take his
deposition, or to submit interrogatories to him." State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 88 I, 884-85 (N.J. 1953).
This notion that the Fifth Amendment precluded discovery against the criminal defendant
persisted into the most recent era, where it has been gradually abridged. The seminal case is
United States v. Nobles where the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit ruling that criminal
discovery was "basically a one-way street." United States v.Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975).
23 David W. Louisell, CriminalDiscovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L. REV. 56,
99 (1961).
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of his own written confession, the Court could not compel it.24 The extreme deference the courts were willing to provide to the executive branch
prosecutor was perhaps best reflected in the near-total absence of any judicially imposed sanctions on prosecutors who not only failed to fulfill, but
willfully and outrageously violated, their presumed obligations to promote
justice."
The received truth within the judicial branch was that our criminal justice system had achieved an essential, yet precarious, balance of opposing
forces, and the opposing forces were not of equal merit. Whatever theory of
discovery authorized the mutual exchange of information between equally
worthy civil litigants, that theory did not apply to the uniquely, and unduly,
privileged class of criminal defendants. One of the most widely cited expressions of judicial impatience with demands for greater criminal discovery during this era was made by then-District Court Judge Learned Hand:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence;
he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of
any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly
or foully, I have never been able to see ....
Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the
ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need
to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs,
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.
Sentiments of the sort expressed by Judge Hand remained redolent
throughout the judiciary during the pre-Brady era, despite the courts' embrace of civil discovery and even the subsequent advent of the country's
first criminal discovery statute in 1946 with Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Yet the declarative expression of the legal foundation
to the doctrine of nondiscovery was attributed to then-Chief Judge Cardozo in the 1927 New York case of People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court.7 Car24

Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 8oi

(1952).

A recent investigative report by the Chicago Tribune reported that out of 381 cases
examined where a homicide conviction had been reversed for a Brady violation, not one led
to any sanction against the errant prosecutors. "With impunity, prosecutors across the country
have violated their oaths and the law, committing the worst kinds of deception in the most
serious of cases." Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error:How ProsecutorsSacrifice
Justice to Win, CHI. TIUB., Jan. 1o, 1999, at Ci; see also Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions
Against Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations: A Paper 7-ger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693 (1987); Fred C.
Zacharias, The ProfessionalDiscipline ofProsecutors, 79 N.C.L. REv. 721 (2oo 1); Note, The Duty
of the Prosecutorto DiscloseExculpatory Evidence, 6o COLUM. L. REv. 858 (1960).
26 United States v. Garsson, 291 F 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
27 People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 156 N.E. 84 (N.Y. 1927).
25
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dozo explained that discovery was unknown in the early common law; the
common law courts deemed themselves without inherent power to order
such relief2S From Cardozo's opinion emerged the settled understanding
of the limits of discovery available in criminal cases: the courts had, at best,
a very limited discretionary authority to compel discovery; discovery was in
any event limited to items of admissible evidence; and the defendant was
recognized to possess no inherent right to any discovery, including items of
admissible evidence that were critical to the case against him. What movement there was in the area of criminal discovery came primarily, although
not entirely,29 from legislative reform. 30 The courts remained, in general
aspect, hostile to discovery by the criminal defendant well into the modern
era of discovery.3'
One of the more telling, and foretelling, discovery cases to be decided
in this pre-Brady era came from the New Jersey Supreme Court. In State v.
Tune,32 the defendant was arrested for murder and signed a fourteen-page
confession on the day of his arrest. The trial court ordered the prosecution to
provide the defendant with a copy of his confession. The state was permitted to file an interlocutory appeal with the New Jersey Supreme Court and
virtually every county prosecutor in New Jersey joined the prosecution's
brief. The New Jersey Supreme Court was sharply split over the issue,
and a 4-3 majority reversed the trial court's order. The extreme displeasure
with a defendant's demand for discovery expressed by Judge Hand some
30 years earlier was apparently still vital with the majority. Chief Justice
Vanderbilt wrote the opinion for the court and wasted no time in getting to
the fundamental flaws in criminal discovery:
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often
discovery will lead not to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury
and the suppression of evidence. Thus the- criminal who is aware of the
whole case against him will often procure perjured testimony in order to set
up a false defense. Another result of full discovery would be that the criminal defendant who is informed of the names of all of the State's witnesses
may take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testimony or
into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to testify. Moreover,
many witnesses, if they know that the defendant will have knowledge of
their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come forward with information

28 See id. at 84.
29 See id. at 84-85 (noting that despite some statutorily mandated discovery, "the remedy

of discovery and inspection was framed by courts of equity").
30 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, enacted in 1946, was the nation's first criminal discovery statute.

31 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, for example, were denied discovery of the very overt
acts and physical items of espionage cited in their capital indictment. See United States v.

Rosenberg, io ER.D. 521,523 (S.D.N.Y. i95o).
32 State v. Tune, 98 A.zd 881 (N.J. 1953).
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during the investigation of the crime .... To permit unqualified disclosure
of all statements and information in the hands of the State would go far
beyond what is required in civil cases; it would defeat the very ends of
justice.

33

The defendant in Tune had apparently based his appeal to the court in
part on the fact that England, from whom, according to Judge Cardozo, we
inherited our doctrine of no discovery, had long since adopted a more liberal approach to discovery in criminal matters. Justice Vanderbilt found this
comparison inapposite in part on the basis of certain historical differences
with English practice, but more pointedly on the ground that in England
"the law-abiding instincts of the population are in marked contrast to the
disrespect for law which has long characterized the American frontier and
which has not yet disappeared as the criminal statistics indicate in certain
segments of the American population."3 All of these dire musings were
prompted by the simple fact that the defendant Tune had been granted
permission by the trial court to see a copy of his own signed confession.
There was a stinging dissent in Tune. It was written by then-New Jersey
Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan. Brennan's dissent, long since
forgotten but no doubt one of the most poignant refutations of the no-discovery doctrine ever put forward, began with a sharp reference to "that old
hobgoblin perjury., 35 He then proceeded directly to attack the "anachronistic apprehension" that discovery in criminal cases would subvert the adversarial system of justice. 36 Brennan acknowledged that the playing field
of criminal justice was not level, but he described the tilt as one in favor
of the prosecution. He noted that it was the state that bore not only all the
resources of criminal investigation but all of the de jure advantages as well.
"This accused's confession, as indeed is true virtually of all confessions, was
the product of exparte discovery in a form which would never be tolerated
in a civil cause." 37 Brennan's point here is revelatory, for what he describes
is the simple insight that during the pretrial stage of our adversarial system,
the American prosecutor has investigative powers and privileges that not
only match but in some respects exceed those of the state investigator in
an inquisitorial system. He emphasized the basic adversarial unfairness of
permitting counsel for the state to develop its case for trial with the aid of
a confession obtained from the defendant, while that same material was

33 Id. at 884 (citations omitted).
34 Id. at 889.
35 Id. at 894 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan appears to have taken his hobgoblin metaphor from Professor Sunderland, who referred to "this legal hobgoblin of perjury" in an influential article advocating more liberalized rules of discovery. Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and
Method of Discovery Before Trial,42 YALE L.J. 863, 868 (1932-33).
36 Tune, 98 A.2d at 894 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 896.
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denied to the defendant's counsel in preparing the defense. 8 Also, given
that Tune was being tried for a capital offense, the denial of such rudimentary discovery "shocks my sense of justice. 39 Justice Brennan still saved
his most bitter cut for last. He recognized that the deeper insinuation of
Judge Hand's perorations on criminal discovery was not only a thinly veiled
bias against the criminally accused and their counsel, but even more so an
attack upon the essential integrity of the adversarial system of criminal
justice as such:
The implication in the majority's argument is that the accused is guilty so
that not only is he not to be heard to complain of the use of the confession by the police as evidence to prove that fact and as a source of leads to
make the case against him as ironclad as possible, but also that he has no
complaint that his counsel are denied its use to aid them better to develop
the whole truth. In other words, the state may eat its cake and have it too.
To that degree the majority view sets aside the presumption of innocence
and is blind to the superlatively important public interest in the acquittal
of the innocent.40
To anyone burrowing through the turgid recitations found in the early
criminal discovery case law, the sharp insights of Justice Brennan are stunning, if not compelling. He turns upside down the adversarial underpinnings of the no-discovery doctrine. He heralds the modern claim that our
adversarial system of justice is not threatened, but rather supported and
preserved, by a more transparent prosecution. A decade later, Justice Brennan would find himself in the majority on a different court in ruling for
greater prosecutorial disclosure in Brady. However, even this success was
short lived, for Justice Brennan ended his career on the Supreme Court
in much the same manner that he ended his service on the New Jersey
court: in sharp dissent over the issue of prosecutorial disclosure. His vision
of a more fair and open prosecution has never truly prevailed against the
hobgoblins of disclosure. So, despite some genuine movement in the case
law of the late I950s, 4' the situation with regard to criminal discovery had
remained much as it had always been: "[tirial by judicial battle, in which
concealment is one of the major weapons,
remains the modus operandi of
42
the criminal fact-finding process.
The Supreme Court, as shall be seen below, has never truly vanquished
these hobgoblins. Certainly, prior to its opinion in Brady the Court had

Id.
ld.
Id. at 897.
See Fletcher, supranote zi.
42 Note, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 6o YALE L.J. 6z6, 6z6 (95)
omitted).
38
39
40
4I

(citation
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never had occasion to engender any rule making, constitutional or otherwise, with regard to the discoverability of exculpatory material within the
prosecutor's files. So who did the high court turn to, in the middle years of
the Warren Court era, when it decided to announce for the first time a constitutional rule of discovery for exculpatory material? Tom Mooney.
Mooney was a colorful character of the pre-World War I era whose life
story became something of a legend written in law. His case, Mooney v.
Holohan,43 managed to wind its way to the high court some nineteen years
after he had been convicted of murder in San Francisco and sentenced to
hang. Mooney was an itinerant radical labor socialist who traveled the country getting into trouble, but it was in San Francisco that he found his true
nemesis, a private company detective named Martin Swanson. Swanson instigated charges against Mooney in 1914 for possession of dynamite related
to a protracted and violent strike against Pacific Gas and Electric, but after
three jury trials, Mooney was ultimately acquitted. Two years later, during a pro-war march in San Francisco, a bomb went off, killing ten people.
Swanson again joined the investigation, and Mooney was indicted for the
murders. This time, Mooney was convicted. Following a series of stormy
protests by the labor community, Mooney's sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment, but the challenges to Mooney's conviction did not subside.
In 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and Law Enforcement, better known as the Wickersham Commission, began issuing a series
of reports on the state of American criminal justice. 44 One of its reports
reviewed all the claims that had been made regarding Mooney's conviction,
and its conclusions have been summarized as follows:
Subsequent investigation showed that every one of the state's witnesses
had lied, with the encouragement of the district attorney and his assistants.
The state's chief witness was probably at least ninety miles away at the time
of the explosion. The district attorney intentionally suppressed evidence
concerning the credibility of every witness. And he suppressed a photograph showing Mooney and his friends on top of a distant building two
minutes before the explosion.45
The California courts remained adamant about not granting relief to
Mooney despite an ongoing series of revelations concerning the foregoing
irregularities. Mooney's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging a denial of due process, had been denied by both the district and Ninth Circuit
courts on the ground that he had not exhausted his state remedies. When
the case at long last arrived at the Supreme Court, the state argued that due

43 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
44 See Note, The Prosecutor's ConstitutionalDuty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant,74
L.J. 136, 136 n.3 (1964).
45 Id. at 136.
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process did not apply on the facts because: (i)"the acts or omissions of a
prosecuting attorney" could never amount to a denial of due process and
6
(z) the defendant had a right
only to discovery that constituted "notice"
4
of the charges themselves. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
the petition on the ground of nonexhaustion, but nonetheless did pause
in what was to become critical dicta to refute the substantive claims of the
state:
[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a
State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a
like result by intimidation.
So even though Mooney lost, the law of due process did gain. 8 Mooney
spawned a line of cases that found a due process violation where the prosecutor had either suborned or subordinated perjured testimony at trial.' 9
However, Mooney had not separately addressed the matter of the prosecutor's withholding of exculpatory material, and so neither did the early case
law. All of the early cases in the Mooney line relied upon a finding of perjury
at trial which was known to the trial prosecutor. 0 By the close of the 1950s,
only the Third Circuit had managed to decide two cases which extended
the Mooney doctrine to circumstances where the prosecutor had concealed
critical exculpatory material although there was no explicit finding that the
prosecutor had knowingly sponsored perjured testimony."

46 Mooney,294 U.S. at I11-12.
47 Id.at 112.
48 Mooney continued to lose. The Supreme Court rendered its opinion on January 21,
1935. Mooney immediately sought a writ in the state court and was just as immediately denied. On May 14, 1935, the California District Court of Appeal denied his writ in a rather brazen opinion which declared that, with regard to the doctrine of due process, only the Supreme
Court of California could create such a "departure from the established legal doctrine" of the
State of California. In rr Mooney, 45 P.2d 388,389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).
49 The leading cases, all involving similar facts, are Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607
(196o); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); and Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
50 See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945) ("And we have often pointed out that
a conviction, secured by the use of perjured testimony known to be such by the prosecuting
attorney, is a denial of due process.")
51 See United States ex rr/. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.zd 763 (3d Cir. 1955); United States
ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F2d 815 (3d Cit. 1952).
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A. The SpecialCase of Exculpatory Discovery
The traditional judicial aversion to providing the criminal defendant with
pretrial discovery of the prosecution's case against him was based on the
theory that the defense would likely misuse the information to illicitly undermine the prosecution's case. Exculpatory material in the prosecutor's
file, on the other hand, is information that is by definition not part of the
prosecutor's case. It is information that the prosecutor would not otherwise
present at trial and would be of use only to the defendant in building a defense to the prosecution's case. It might be assumed therefore that the doctrine of no discovery, which was dedicated to preserving the prosecutor's
adversarial privilege of keeping one's cards face down until the moment
of play at trial, would have no application to cards that were not in fact
part of the prosecutor's trial hand. Indeed, it might even seem self-evident
that the prosecutor's privilege to withhold discovery until the moment of
trial, in order to promote an uncompromised pursuit of truth, operates to
contradict the notion that the prosecutor should have any privilege to permanently withhold relevant and exculpatory evidence not only from the
criminal defendant but from the trial court and jury as well.
The signal significance of this self-evident distinction between inculpatory and exculpatory information was never acknowledged within the
no-discovery doctrine. Indeed, there was absolutely no recognition within
the criminal discovery doctrine that the matter of a prosecutor's failure to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused presented a special case of any
sort. This failure of the doctrine may be explained in part by the fact that
prosecutorial nondisclosure was rarely uncovered by a convicted defendant in the era prior to statutory rules of discovery, freedom of information
laws, and the like, and therefore, the issue rarely came before the courts.
But there is also a more direct and simple explanation rooted in Justice
Brennan's dissent in Tune.5 2 Consider that if the existence of exculpatory
material of any sort was thought by the prosecutor to actually raise a serious doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the case would be unlikely ever
to make it to the courtroom. There would be no discovery issue because
there would be no case. Thus in virtually all cases where there is an issue
of exculpatory material within the knowing possession of the prosecution,
the prosecutor has presumptively decided that, despite the "apparently"
exculpatory material, the defendant is nonetheless guilty. The prosecutor
who finds herself in possession of exculpatory material regarding a case
which she nonetheless intends to prosecute to conviction has by circumstance, if not by definition, a strong and quite righteous adversarial incentive to conceal that information.

52

See supra notes 35-4o and accompanying text.
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Viewed in these terms it becomes apparent why the prosecutor, and by
extension the courts, would consider the discovery of exculpatory material by the defense to be an even greater threat than is general discovery,
no matter how extensive, with regard to obtaining a deserved conviction.
Providing a defendant with discovery of his own confession and similar
inculpatory evidence is one thing; it merely provides the presumptively
unethical defense bar with a better opportunity to falsify its defense to the
charges. Exculpatory material presents a more direct and powerful threat
to the prosecution, for here the information is in its native state, prior to
disclosure, evidence of a weakness in the prosecution's case against the
presumptively guilty defendant. This simple insight lies at the heart of
Justice Brennan's dissent in Tune. There he pointed out that the hobgoblins
of criminal discovery made sense only against a backdrop of a presumption
of guilt.53 The moment one accepts that the defendant might in fact be not
guilty of the charges, the external justification for secreting from him access to information that might very well convince a jury of that fact utterly
vanishes.
Thus, on the eve of the Supreme Court's consideration of the defendant's petition in Brady v. Maryland, there was virtually no law requiring
pretrial discovery by the defense of exculpatory material within the state's
possession. Mooney required prosecutors to refrain from suborning perjury,
but there was no affirmative legal obligation, either in the case law or the
new criminal discovery statutes, for a prosecutor to provide the defense
with any exculpatory material prior to and independent of the trial itself.
The hobgoblins of criminal discovery had to some extent been compromised, but otherwise appeared to remain staunchly on guard.
B. The Supreme CourtDoctrine: theLogic of the Looking-Glass
The Brady doctrine has bedeviled the courts for its entire forty years. It
has been reviewed and restated by a succession of high-court justices, and
the lower courts have exhibited no clearly independent or even readily
discernible point of sail. With each new interpretive turn by the Supreme
Court, the academic literature has responded with a collective dissent. The
concern of this section is not to replow this field of failures but rather to attempt to identify the central failure of the doctrine in all its iterations. This
section will review only the major developments in the Supreme Court
cases and only with regard to their bearing on our designated purpose. It
will be made evident that the Brady doctrine has failed not only with respect to what it should be but even with regard to what it purports to be.
Brady is not a rule of constitutional discovery designed to entitle a criminal
defendant to obtain exculpatory information gathered by the state to be

53 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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used by the defendant in whatever fair manner best serves his defense
to the state's charges. Rather, it is quite the opposite. Brady is now a rule
that both encourages and shields pretrial nondisclosure by the prosecutor.
The central failure of the Brady doctrine is therefore its unyielding commitment to an idealized regime of prosecutorial privilege, rather than to a
modern regime of adversarial transparency and fair play.
i. Brady v. Maryland.-John Brady had as little luck before the Supreme
Court as did John Mooney: he lost his appeal even though his case helped
to transform the law. Brady and his codefendant Boblit had jointly robbed
a man named Brooks and dragged him into some woods where one of the
defendants then strangled him to death s4 The two defendants were tried
separately on a capital count of felony-murder. Each of the defendants at
trial admitted the robbery but claimed, in apparent hope of avoiding the
death penalty, that the other defendant had committed the actual murder.
Brady had made a pretrial motion to discover the confessions that his codefendant Boblit had made to the police. The prosecution turned over several such statements but excluded one statement in which Boblit admitted
that it was he who had strangled the victim. Brady was tried first, convicted,
and sentenced to death.
At Boblit's subsequent trial, where he was also convicted and sentenced
to death, the prosecution attempted to introduce the confession in which
he admitted strangling the victim. Brady then filed a motion for a new trial
on the ground that the earlier failure to disclose Boblit's confession of strangling was a denial of Brady's due process. The Maryland Court of Appeals
ultimately agreed with Brady that he had been denied due process but
only with regard to his sentencing, not his underlying conviction of felonymurder. The Maryland court ordered that a new jury be empaneled only
for the purpose of hearing evidence to reconsider whether Brady should
be sentenced to death.5 Brady then appealed that order directly to the Supreme Court on the ground that due process required a retrial not only on
the issue of punishment but on the issue of guilt as well. s6 Given that Brady
had testified at his trial and fully admitted his role in the underlying robbery, his appeal to the Supreme Court appeared to raise a relatively narrow,
complex, and not entirely compelling issue of state capital procedure. 7

54 See Brady v. State, 154 A.zd 434,435 (Md. 1959).
55 Seegenerally Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167 (Md. 1961).
56 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85 (1963).
57 The essential issue in Brady was evidentiary in nature: was the evidence of the codefendant's confession admissible under Maryland law on the issue of either guilt or punishment? This issue was made extremely complex by both state law and the court record itself.
Maryland then conducted capital cases in a unified, rather than a bifurcated, trial. Therefore
if the evidence was admissible on either ground, it should have been admitted at trial. But
Maryland law was completely uncertain as to whether the evidence was in fact admissible on
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The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the Maryland
Court of Appeals. But in so doing the Supreme Court, per Justice Douglas,
nonetheless took the opportunity to render a purported "holding" that essentially reiterated the state court holding on the underlying denial of due
process: "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.,,8
The Maryland court had not mentioned Mooney v. Holohan, but it did
cite both Almeida and Thompson, the two Third Circuit cases that had extended the Mooney doctrine beyond the limits of prosecutorial presentation of perjured testimony." Justice Douglas therefore noted the Supreme
Court's holding as "an extension of Mooney v. Holohan."6o The critical turn
in Brady came with regard to Justice Douglas' description of the interests
that were put at risk whenever a prosecutor took it upon himself to withhold relevant and favorable evidence from the accused:
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly.... A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an
accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce
the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That
casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not
comport with standards of justice, even though, as in the present case, his
action is not6 'the result of guile,' to use the words of the [Maryland] Court
1
of Appeals.
This was the passage that appeared to transform the Mooney doctrine
from a rule of appellate review of factually corrupt trials into a doctrine of
adversarial fairness that required disclosure "on demand" to the defense
in order to prevent the prosecutor from becoming the sole adversarial "architect" of the trial proceeding. But, even though the opinion sounded in
discovery, there was of course no such holding. Three justices wrote separately to repudiate Justice Douglas' intimation of just such a due process

either ground and the state appellate court had found a due process violation without actually
ruling that the evidence would in fact be admissible on retrial on either ground. On top of this,
the Maryland Constitution made juries the judges of the law as well as the facts. Therefore
the Court also had to wrestle with the question of whether the underlying evidentiary issue
was a matter properly for the court or the jury. See generallyid.
58 Id. at 87.
59 See Brady, 174 A.2d at 169.

6o Brady,373 U.S. at 86.
61 Id. at 87-88.
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rule of discovery. Justice White concurred in the result but recognized the
implications of Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court. He first noted that
"the due process discussion by the Court is wholly advisory," and then
registered his firm disagreement with that advice: "I would employ more
confining language and would not cast in constitutional form a broad rule of
criminal discovery. Justice Harlan, writing for himself and Justice Black,
dissented on the ground that there was no basis for any due process discussion by the Court.63
Despite the fact that there was no actual holding in Brady, and certainly
no clear establishment of a rule of pretrial discovery, the case was widely
received as though the activist Warren Court had issued such a ruling. Thus
the immediate response to Brady represented a moment of genuine new
discovery within the criminal justice system.
Giglio v. United States.-The Warren Court never rendered another
substantive opinion to confirm or clarify its "holding" in Brady. The only
other case to come before it that raised a Brady issue was Giles v. Maryland,64 but this case so divided the justices that it was resolved only by
getting five of them to agree to remand it to the state court.65 That Court
therefore never delineated what the apparently expanded liberty interests
were that the due process doctrine of Brady was designed to protect and
what the prosecutor's affirmative obligations, if any, were with regard to
safeguarding those interests.
The next substantive opinion of the Supreme Court was written by
Chief Justice Burger in Giglio v. United States.6 Giglio had been charged
with cashing forged money orders with the aid of an accomplice named
Taliento, the bank teller who had cashed the money orders. Taliento was
arrested first and he was promised by a federal prosecutor that "if he eventually testified as a witness for the Government at the trial of the defendant,
JOHN GIGLIO, he would not be prosecuted.,, 6' A different federal prosecutor presented the case at trial against Giglio where "the Government's
case depended almost entirely on Taliento's testimony."" Under pressing
cross-examination, Taliento denied that he had been promised immunity
2.

62 Id. at 92 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
63 Id. at 92 & n. i (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64 Giles v.Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
65 There were three separate opinions by the majority justices. Two of them, by Justices
Brennan and Fortas, contained the strongest claims ever to issue from the Supreme Court as
to why the due process rule of Brady must apply to pretrial discovery. See id. at 67 (plurality
opinion of Brennan, J.), 96 (Fortas, J., concurring in the judgment).
66 Giglio v. United States, 4o5 U.S. 150 (1972).
67 Id. at 153 n.2.
68 Id. at 154.
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from the prosecution: "I believe I still could be prosecuted." 69 During his
summation, the prosecutor compounded the perjury by telling the jury that
Taliento "received no promises that he would not be indicted."70 Giglio
was convicted and Taliento was not prosecuted.
There were therefore a number of troubling aspects to the process that
led to Giglio's conviction. The star witness against him had entered into
a cooperation agreement with the prosecution that essentially guaranteed
that he would not be prosecuted in return for his testimony, and that agreement was never disclosed to the defense, despite vigorous attempts to discover it. That witness then committed perjury by denying the prosecutor's
promise. The prosecutor then (perhaps unwittingly) confirmed and relied
upon that perjury in his summation to the jury. Furthermore, when called
upon to account for their involvement in the foregoing matters, two assistant U.S. attorneys flatly contradicted each other and placed the blame on
7
one another. '
The Supreme Court presumably could have addressed the manner in
which each of these procedural failings contributed to the due process violation found by the Court. But the Court carefully avoided, to the point of
dismissing, all of the apparent failures of the prosecutors. Instead the Court
focused entirely on the fact that a witness had presented perjurious testimony at trial and treated the issue as one that was resolved almost entirely
by the pre-Brady case law.
As long ago as Mooney v. Holohan, this Court made clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is
incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." This was reaffirmed
in Pylev. Kansas.In Napuev. Illinois, we said, "(t)he same result obtains when
the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected
when it appears." Thereafter Brady v. Maryland held that suppression of
material evidence justifies a new trial "irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution." When the "reliability of a given witness may well
be determinative of guilt or innocence," nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.
72

In this expression of the general rule, Brady stands merely for the already settled proposition that where material perjury is presented to the
jury, the trial is a violation of due process regardless of any deliberate misconduct by the prosecution. Thus, the Giglio opinion uses Brady somewhat
perversely to render moot the transparent bad faith of one or both of the
two federal prosecutors on the case. The opinion not only failed to con-

69 Id.at 151.
70 Id. at 152.
71 See generally id.
72 Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
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sider whether the prosecutors had any affirmative obligation to reveal the
rather standard cooperation agreement with the witness prior to trial, but
it also rendered irrelevant whether the federal prosecutors on the case had
deliberately contrived the deception. The district court judge "did not undertake to resolve the apparent conflict between the two Assistant United
States Attorneys" on the nonsensical theory that the original prosecutor did
not have the authority to enter into the agreement with the witness and
73
therefore "its disclosure to the jury would not have affected its verdict."
The Supreme Court exhibited nearly the same insouciance towards the
apparently severe misconduct of at least someone in the prosecutor's office:
"We need not concern ourselves with the differing versions of the events
as described by the two assistants in their affidavits."7 4 Not only was this
opinion hardly an affirmation of the new regime of discovery "on demand"
to prevent the prosecutor from becoming the sole adversarial "architect"
of the trial evidence presented to the jury, it actually appeared to establish
an essential understanding that Brady was not a paradigm shift in the due
process doctrine of exculpatory disclosures. The governing issue remained,
as it was in Mooney and Napue, a failure to disclose exculpatory information
to the jury, rather than to the defense.
Giglio has generally been regarded as an easy case which simply extended the rule of Brady to information that was material to the credibility of a
state witness. Yet, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that Giglio was
in fact the Supreme Court's first of many turns against the new protocols
initiated by Brady.
3. United States v. Agurs.-By 1976 the lower courts, with little or no
guidance from the Supreme Court, had become thoroughly confused regarding the appropriate standard of review for an alleged Brady violation.
The Supreme Court therefore made its first attempt at settling a rule of
law for the Brady doctrine in United States v. Agurs.7 The opinion for the
Court, by Justice Stevens, did not succeed. It appeared only to compound
the confusion of the lower courts and was ultimately rejected by the Court
nine years later in UnitedStates v. Bagley. 6 But the opinion, however unsuccessful, did at least serve for present purposes to reveal the Court's rather
obtuse assessment of the critical interests implicated in a Brady review.
Linda Agurs had stabbed a man to death after "a brief interlude in an
inexpensive motel room."7 7 Her defense at trial was that the man had attacked her and that she had stabbed him in self defense with his own knife.

73
74
75
76
77

Id. at

153.

Id.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1985).
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 98.
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She relied primarily on the fact that the man was known to carry two knives
on his person and had been on top of her and in possession of the fatal knife
when motel employees entered the room and separated the two struggling
guests. Agurs was convicted. Several months later, her attorney learned that
the prosecutor had failed to turn over to the defense the victim's prior criminal record, which contained two convictions for crimes involving the possession of a knife. The defense attorney had made no prior request for such
information from the prosecutor, yet the victim's prior convictions would
have been admissible at trial." The circuit court reversed Agurs' conviction
on this ground, despite the lack of a pretrial request by the defense attorney.79 The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court in part on the ground
that there was no violation of due process where the defendant had made
no "specific request" for the victim's criminal recordY°
Agurs was an extremely troublesome opinion which endlessly befuddled
the lower courts and legal commentators. What is of concern here is not so
much its failed attempt at settling the doctrine, but rather the manner in
which the Court engaged the interpretive process to disavow the original
promise of Brady. Justice Stevens opened the analytic section of his opinion with the declaration that the Brady rule "arguably" bore an application
in "three quite different situations. What was remarkable about this assertion was Stevens' description of the common element shared by these
three situations: "Each involves the discovery, after trial of information
which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.",82
In other words, Brady was not even intended to have any application to the
pretrial discovery process. Although this was certainly not what Justice Stevens intended to convey by that statement, it did certainly reveal the very
limited remedial construct in which the Court assumed Brady to apply. It
applied only when the prosecutor withheld exculpatory information and
then the defense, independently and perhaps fortuitously, made that discovery only "after trial." Strictly speaking, therefore, Brady had no application to the prosecutor who withheld exculpatory information prior to trial,
and no application to cases that were not finally resolved by trial. This was
only the first of several telling suggestions in the opinion that Brady was
not intended to create any affirmative obligations on the prosecutor to disclose information favorable to the accused, but was strictly a rule of appellate review to govern those limited situations where the errant prosecutor
himself was "discovered."

78 Id. at Ioo & n.z.
79 Id. at IOZ.
8o Id. at ioo n.17.
81 Id. at 103.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
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This truncated interpretation of the reach of Brady was made even more
explicit in a later section of the opinion. There is of course no reason why
the Due Process Clause(s) relied upon in Brad should not apply to failures
in the pretrial processing of a criminal case. However, Justice Stevens
made clear that Brady had no application to the pretrial discovery process
otherwise governed by statute:
We are not considering the scope of discovery authorized by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, or the wisdom of amending those Rules to enlarge the defendant's discovery rights. We are dealing with the defendant's
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendright to a fair trial mandated
84
ment to the Constitution.
This statement implied that there was no possibility of a violation of
8s
Brady in the ninety percent or so of criminal cases that never went to trial.
The opinion went on to confirm the implication. "But to reiterate a critical
point, the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." 6 Justice Stevens then reinforced
this limitation by claiming that creating a constitutional rule of pretrial discovery could not be limited to anything short of "complete discovery."8'
This specter of a complete abrogation of the adversarial system of strictly
limited and discretionary disclosure, however exaggerated, was nothing if
not a haunting reminder of the hobgoblins of the common law era.
Another aspect of the Agurs opinion worth noting is the manner in
which it almost totally shifted the burden of disclosure from one adversary to the other. In rejecting the articulation of the standard of materiality that led to the reversal by the circuit court, the opinion asserted that
"the constitutional standard of materiality must impose a higher burden on
the defendant."88 At the trial court level, when the defendant moved for a
new trial upon her discovery of the withheld information, the prosecution
took the position that it had no obligation to turn over any exculpatory

83 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has of course "incorporated" virtually all of the Bill of Rights whose provisions have varied and extensive application during the
pretrial stage of a criminal case. That clause standing alone also has been directly applied to
the commands of fundamental fairness to the defendant in the pretrial setting. See, e.g., Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (requiring the state to provide the defendant with pretrial access to a psychiatric expert in order to investigate and prepare an insanity defense).
84 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.
85 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 632 (2002) (plea bargaining is used "in a vast
number--o% or more-of federal criminal cases").
86 Agurs, 427 U.S. at io8.
87 Id. at 1o9.
88 Id. at 112.
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material to the defense "in the absence of an appropriate request."8 9 The
district court, although it denied the defendant's motion, soundly rejected
the government's argument: "THE COURT What are you saying? How
can you request that which you don't know exists? That is the very essence
of Brady.' 90 This telling observation by the trial court appears not to have
greatly influenced Justice Stevens' view of where to assign the burden of
Brady. He developed a multi-tiered rule in which the critical factor was
not the conduct of the prosecutor or the nature of the material withheld
but rather whether the defense had made a "general," "specific," or "no"
request for the material, and where the defense made either a general or no
request for the specific information, the rule of Brady did not apply. What
applied instead was an apparently novel "duty to volunteer" on the part
of the prosecutor.9' This somewhat oxymoronic duty created a situation
where "the prosecutor must decide what, if anything, he should voluntarily submit to defense counsel."' 92 This duty, which appeared to have some
independent constitutional grounding, could be violated only when the
withheld information, standing alone, "creates a reasonable doubt" at the
moment of post-trialjudicial review. 93 The Court furthermore expressed
confidence that the "prudent prosecutor" could be relied upon to err on the
side of disclosure in doubtful situations.94 And, to underscore this reassignment of burdens and privileges under the Brady rule: "Nor do we believe
the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or the
willfulness, of the prosecutor."9'
4. United States v. Bagley.-The next major development in the Brady
doctrine came nine years later in United States v. Bagley.9 Here the Court
abandoned the multi-tiered materiality standards announced in Agurs and
replaced them with a single standard: Brady was not violated, even where
the defendant had made a specific request for the withheld information,
unless the defendant could demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the [trial] proceeding would have been different." 97 Bagley, therefore, rejected Agurs only
to extend the essential movement away from the early promise of Brady
and towards a legal regime in which the prosecutor was once again entirely

89 Id. at io.
Id. at102 (emphasis in original).
91 Id. at io6-07.
92 Id.at 107.
90

93 Id. at 112.
94
95
96
97

Id. at io8.
Id. at i o.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
Id. at 682.
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privileged to withhold exculpatory information until the defendant managed to both discover and prove, post trial, that the prosecutor's conduct,
standing alone, had probably cost him an acquittal.
The facts alone in Bagley are intriguing. They appear on their face to
be so compromising as to underscore the extremes to which the Court was
prepared to take the Brady doctrine. Bagley had been indicted on fifteen
counts of possession of both drugs and guns. The investigation had been
conducted by two state law enforcement officers who had been working as
security guards for the Milwaukee Railroad. The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had engaged the two guards to conduct
the investigation of Bagley. The two guards had entered into standard form
contracts with the ATF that bore the revealing title: "Contract for Purchase
of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor." 98 They signed these
contracts in the presence of the Special Agent of the ATF in charge of the
case. The boilerplate language on the form stated that the two guards were
required to testify against the subject of the investigation and would be
paid "a sum commensurate with services and information rendered." The
contracts contained a blank line titled: "Sum to be Paid to Vendor" which
was later filled in with the sum of $300.oo.99 During the course of their
investigation of Bagley, the two guards also signed a number of standard
ATF investigation affidavits, each of which concluded with the statement
that the information provided was made "without any threats or rewards,
or promises of reward having been made to me in return for it."' ° Prior to
trial, Bagley made a formal discovery request for "any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony."' ° ' The assistant U.S. attorney turned over to the defense all of the affidavits denying
any promise of reward, but failed to turn over the contracts signed by each
of his two witnesses. The prosecutor later claimed that he had no knowledge of the standard form ATF contracts signed by the two witnesses. 0 2At
trial, both witnesses testified that they had been outfitted with a concealed
transmitter to record their various conversations with Bagley but that the
tapes had turned out to be inaudible. Therefore, the government's entire
case depended upon the testimony and the credibility of the two witnesses.
On cross examination, one of the two guards denied that the ATF agents
had done anything to pressure him to cooperate with their investigation.' 0 3
Bagley waived a jury trial and was tried before the court. When the defense
attorney in his summation attempted to argue to the court that the two

98 Id. at 670-7 1.
99 Id. at 67 i.
ioo Id. at 670 (citation omitted).
i oi Id. at 669-70.
io2 Id. at 671 n.4.
103 Id. at 686-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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witnesses had "fabricated" their account.of Bagley's involvement, the trial
judge responded directly:
Let me say this to you. I would find it hard to believe really that their testimony was fabricated. I think they might have been mistaken. You know,
it is possible that they were mistaken. I really did not get the impression at
all that either one or both of those men were trying at least in court here to
make a case against the defendant. ' 4
Bagley was convicted by the court only of the drug charges. He was
sentenced on the various counts to a combination of six months imprisonment, five years' probation, and a special parole term. Neither Bagley nor
the trial court learned of the prosecutor's withholding of the form contracts
until some two-and-a-half years later when his attorney made a request for
information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act'05 and the Privacy
Act of 1974. Bagley then filed a motion to vacate his sentence before the
district court judge, who referred the matter to a magistrate to conduct an
evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the ATF case agent testified that all
the payments made to the two witnesses were for expenses. The magistrate did not credit this particular testimony but then did go on to make
some equally remarkable findings. He found that the two witnesses had
signed blank contracts which were filled in only after the trial. Therefore,
he concluded that "[blecause neither witness was promised or expected
payment for his testimony, the United States did not withhold, during pretrial discovery, information as to any 'deals, promises or inducements' to
these witnesses." 07 The district court, in turn, rejected this latter finding
by the magistrate but nonetheless found "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
timely disclosure of the withheld information would have had "no effect"
on his verdict.' °0 This particular claim by the district court was thereupon
rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which found the prosecutor's failure to disclose the exculpatory information a violation of both the defendant's due
process rights under Brady and also his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under Davis v. Alaska.'°9
Standing alone, the government's failure to produce requested Brady information is a serious due process violation. In fact, this failure is "seldom,
if ever, excusable." But a failure to disclose requested Brady information
that the defendant could use to conduct an effective cross-examination is

to4 Id. at 69o (emphasis omitted).
io5 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (2oo4).
1o6 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (2004).
107 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 673.

io8 Id.
io9 See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 E2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974)), rev'd,473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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even more egregious because it threatens the defendant's right to confront
adverse witnesses, and therefore, his right to a fair trial.10
The Supreme Court, in turn, rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding, finding that the Sixth Amendment was not at issue on the basis of a somewhat
tenuous distinction between active and passive restrictions on cross examination. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment applied only to
circumstances where the trial court engaged in a "direct restriction" on
cross examination by sustaining an objection to a question posed on cross
examination."' But that was not the case in Bagley. "The constitutional error, if any, in this case was the Government's failure to assist the defense
by disclosing information that might have been helpful in conducting the
cross-examination.""' 2 The Court, therefore, restricted its own analysis to
whether the government's nondisclosure was a violation of Brady.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's due process holding
and remanded the case for consideration under its new standard of materiality. A new standard was of course required in order to escape the firm
declaration in Agurs that "[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable."" 3 What is most pertinent to the present analysis is the actual reasoning that permitted the Court to conclude that the transparently duplicitous
conduct of virtually the entire cast of government actors in this case was
ultimately excusable. The Court found once again that the burden placed
upon the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory information, even in circumstances where the defendant has filed an express request for the specific
information, presented too great a threat to the adversarial system and its
attendant privileges:
The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is
not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth
is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur. [By
requiring the prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case, the Brady
rule represents a limited departure from a pure adversary model.] Thus,
the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel,
[An interpretation of Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right
of discovery "would entirely alter the character and balance of our present
systems of criminal justice."] but only to disclose evidence favorable to the
4
accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial."

IIO Lumpkin, 719 Ezd at 1464 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v.

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, io6 (1976)).
iii Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 United States v.Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, IO6 (1976).
114 Bagley, 473 U.S. at675 & nn.6-7 (internal footnotes bracketed) (quoting Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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Taken at face value, this is a rather remarkable claim as to the inherent
limitations of our adversary system to accommodate greater transparency
and a more equitable and effective search for truth. It asserts that there is a
fundamental opposition between the disclosure of exculpatory information
and the "primary" status of the adversary system, an opposition which apparently cannot be readily accommodated without threatening the entire
"character and balance" of that system. Therefore, privileging the prosecutor to hold cover over information favorable to the accused is essential to
preserve "the primary means by which truth is uncovered."" ,5Apparently,
nondisclosure of truthful information like the signed contracts of the two
witnesses best serves the pursuit of truth in our adversary system. Bagley
has thus arguably become the clearest illustration of how the Supreme
Court's reworking of the Brady doctrine, and its insistence on developing
an increasingly narrow post-trial standard of review for compromises to the
integral pretrial interests of both the criminal defendant and integrity of
the system, has created a doctrine in which the tail is now wagging the
dog.
5. United States v. Ruiz.-The Court's most recent opinion of note in the
Brady line is UnitedStates v. Ruiz. ,6 The case presented a narrow and utterly unique ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which the Supreme
Court reversed on equally narrow grounds. But the case did present something of a frontal challenge to the Court's constrictive "fair trial" theory of
the Brady doctrine. Ruiz involved the issue of whether, and to what extent,
the Brady rule applied to the vast majority of criminal cases which are not
resolved by trial. The Supreme Court had continually insisted that there
was no violation of Brady outside the context of a demonstrably unfair trial.
"For unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no
constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and absent
a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose." "' 7 However, by the late 199os, the majority of
lower courts had concluded that the due process protections of Brady had
to apply also, in some manner at least, to a case that ended with a conviction
upon a plea of guilty rather than a conviction after trial.' 8 But Ruiz was the
first case considered by the Supreme Court in which the lower court had
granted relief under Brady to a defendant who had pleaded guilty.
Angela Ruiz was arrested and charged with having imported thirty kilograms of marijuana in her luggage. A prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's
115 Id. at 675.
116 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2oo2).
117 Agurs, 427 U.S. at io8.
118 See Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A
Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 573 & n.43 (1999) (collecting
cases).
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Office for the Southern District of California offered Ruiz a standard plea
agreement, referred to as a "fast track" plea bargain, in which she would
plead guilty, waiving a jury trial and related rights and, in return, the prosecutor would recommend a significant sentence reduction to the trial
court." 9 For the most part, this plea offer took the standard form recognized
in all jurisdictions. But the California prosecutor's office had added one additional feature to its standard agreement as a result of an earlier ruling by
the Ninth Circuit that when a defendant pleaded guilty, she did not automatically waive her right to appeal the conviction on Brady grounds.'" 0 The
prosecutor's office had therefore added a clause to its plea agreement that
required the defendant to explicitly waive her right to receive the particular
type of exculpatory information commonly referred to as "Giglio material,"
meaning information favorable to the defendant for use as impeachment
material against a government witness. ' Federal defenders in California
had taken a stand against this provision,'" and so did Angela Ruiz. Ruiz
refused to plead guilty to the "fast track" offer because of its inclusion of
this provision. So she pleaded guilty without the benefit of the promised
sentence reduction but, at the time of her sentencing, argued to the sentencing court that she should nonetheless get the benefit of the sentence
reduction because it was unconstitutional to require her to waive her right
to Giglio material. The trial judge rejected her argument and sentenced her
accordingly. The Ninth Circuit accepted her argument and reversed her
sentence. The circuit court ruling was complex, but essential to its holding
was the conclusion that "a defendant's right to receive undisclosed Brady
material cannot be waived through a plea agreement and that any such
waiver is invalid." 3 This conclusion was based upon a finding that the due
process right guaranteed by Brady was one of a limited number of rights
deemed not waivable by the defendant because the right affected the very
knowing and voluntary character of the waiver itself.'2 Thus, according to
the Ninth Circuit, not only did the disclosure requirements of Brady apply
to the defendant who pleaded guilty without trial, but also that right could
not be waived.
The Supreme Court opinion in Ruiz appeared to be a unanimous, somewhat perfunctory reversal of a one-of-a-kind ruling by the Ninth Circuit: it
held that Brady did not require the disclosure of exculpatory impeachment
information prior to the formation of an otherwise valid plea agreement. But
I 19 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.

i2o See Sanchez v. United States, 50 E3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995).
121 "[Eixculpatory evidence includes 'evidence affecting' witness 'credibility,' where
the witness' 'reliability' is likely 'determinative of guilt or innocence."' Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628
(quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
122 See Franklin, supra note 118, at 568.
123 United States v. Ruiz, 241 E3d 1157, i165 (9th Cir. 2oo), rv'd,536 U.S. 622 (2002).
124 See id.
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surely it was more than that. Consider first that the peculiar facts of Ruiz
only appear to make the opinion a narrow one. Ruiz was appealing on the
ground of legal principle only. There were no "facts" in the ordinary sense
of undisclosed information having subsequently come to light. But what if
such facts had been present? For instance, the Court's holding would presumably have been the same if Ruiz had accepted the fast-track offer and
then, subsequent to her plea of guilty, had discovered that the prosecutor
had withheld seriously damaging information regarding the credibility of
the main witnesses against her. Although the Court's holding was narrow,
the reasoning behind it appeared to place it at ominous odds with critical
developments in the lower courts that have expanded the scope of Brady
beyond the trial-specific limitations of the Supreme Court doctrine.'25
The Court briefly cited three reasons for its holding and the first was
certainly not the least important:
First, impeachment information is special in relation to the fairnessof a trial,
not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary ("knowing," "intelligent," and
"sufficient[ly] aware"). Of course, the more information the defendant has,
the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea, waiver, or decision, and the wiser that decision will likely be. But the Constitution does
not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant. ' 6
What this reasoning would suggest is that not only may the defendant
waive her right to obtain Giglio material prior to a plea of guilty, but even
more so that she may not have any actual right to waive. This reasoning
would support the view that when the criminal defendant chooses on the
basis of her own knowledge of the facts to confess to her crime and offers
to plead guilty, the only constitutional concern is that her plea is otherwise
"voluntary." In other words, although the opinion for the Court certainly
did not take it this far, its reasoning could easily be extended to all Brady
material. As the Court insisted in Bagley, there is no basis in the Brady doctrine for distinguished treatment of Giglio material.' If a defendant voluntarily chooses to inculpate herself and waive her right to a trial, what
principle offairtrialis served by requiring disclosure of information that is
otherwise repudiated by her very admission of guilt? Only Justice Thomas
was willing to confront this issue directly and he did exactly that: "The

125 See, e.g., United States v. Snell, 899 F Supp. 17 (D. Mass. 1995) ("There is no question but that as a general matter, the Brady obligation includes the requirement to turn over
evidence of impeachment."); see also D. MASs. R. 116.2 (disclosure of exculpatory evidence),
available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/LocPubs/combinedoi.pdf.
126 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
127 "This Court has rejected any such distinction between impeachment evidence and
exculpatory evidence." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
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principle supporting Brady was 'avoidance of an unfair trial to
'' the accused.'
8
That concern is not implicated at the plea stage regardless."
The second reason given by the Court for the holding that it is not
necessary to provide a criminal defendant with exculpatory impeachment
information prior to a plea of guilty was that such nondisclosure was essentially a form of "misapprehension" somehow attributed to the defendant
herself.
[T]his Court has found that the Constitution, in respect to a defendant's
awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require complete knowledge
of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea,
with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor. I29
The Court then went on to cite the various misapprehensions it was alluding to, all of which involved either the defendant or her counsel misapprehending: the quality of the evidence; the admissibility of the evidence;
30
the available defenses; the applicable law; and the likely sentences. It
is difficult to understand how the failure to provide the defendant with
exculpatory impeachment information qualified as a comparable "misapprehension" on her part.
The third reason cited by the Court was perhaps the most portentous.
The Court asserted that the very considerations of due process embodied in Brady argued in favor of nondisclosure of impeachment information
prior to a plea of guilty. These considerations apparently included, and required, a balancing of the defendant's interest in disclosure with the state's
interest in nondisclosure.' 3 I This balancing of interests paradigm, while familiar throughout constitutional criminal procedure, had never before been
expressly adopted by the Court in the Brady case law. Not surprisingly, the
Court found significant, indeed ominous, threats to the interests of both
the prosecutor and the system of justice if the prosecutor were required to
reveal exculpatory impeachment information prior to a guilty plea. Thus,
the Court noted that the Government had "stressed what it considered
serious adverse practical implications of the Ninth Circuit's constitutional
holding." 132 For one thing, it risked "premature disclosure of Government
witness information."'' 33 Also, "it could lead the Government instead to
abandon its heavy reliance upon plea bargaining in a vast number-o%

128 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 634 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963)).
129

Id. at 630.

130 Id. at 630-31.
131 See id. at 631.
132

Id. at 626.

133 Id. at 631.
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or more-of federal criminal cases."' 3 4 It was not at all clear why requiring the disclosure of exculpatory impeachment information attendant to a
plea of guilty was deemed such a dire threat to the legitimate interests of
the prosecution. Such a requirement would simply place the prosecution
in precisely the same position they are in following a conviction after trial.
If, subsequent to the conviction by plea of guilty, the defendant managed
to discover that the prosecutor had withheld materialexculpatory information, then the defendant would be entitled to challenge her conviction.
The majority of lower courts had found, prior to Ruiz, that the defendant
was entitled to both types of Brady material prior to a plea of guilty and had
experienced no adverse consequences with that approach.' 3' The Court in
Ruiz, however, appeared overly concerned with keeping the closet door
shut following a plea of guilty, and that concern appeared to reflect all too
clearly a muffled fear of the lingering hobgoblins within.
C. Does the Supreme CourtDoctrineReally Matter?
Even assuming the validity of the foregoing critique of the Brady doctrine,
it is fair to question whether the Supreme Court case law really matters. If,
despite the gaping loopholes in the doctrine, American prosecutors nonetheless function within an adversarial culture which independently constructs operative conventions of fair play, then perhaps the Brady doctrine
is best viewed simply as a loosely woven safety net designed to capture
only the occasional and larger failures of the practice. But what if that is
not the case? What if the Brady doctrine itself is in major part responsible
for the apparently widespread cynical disregard of disclosure obligations
increasingly recognized and reported in the lower court case law? There
is no metric by which to measure the virulence, or even the prevalence, of
such an ethical malaise, but there is now enough evidence in the case law
itself to demonstrate the "materiality" of the doctrine in this respect. A
brief look at several recent opinions from the Second Circuit, easily one of
the most high profile and highly regarded venues for criminal prosecution,
136
should make the point.
In the case of In re United States v. Coppa, the district court, relying
upon Brady, ordered the government prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory material to the defense prior to trial upon request of the defense, with
the exception of any sensitive material the release of which might prove
harmful to a government witness. The prosecutors filed an immediate petition for a writ of mandamus to the Second Circuit. The circuit panel ap-

134 Id. at 63z.
135 "Courts analyzing Brady disclosures at the plea stage also have treated impeachment
and exculpatory evidence alike...." Franklin, supra note i18, at 577.
136 In re United States v. Coppa, 267 F3d 132 (2d Cir. zoo').
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peared to welcome the opportunity to issue an interlocutory rebuke of the
district court's adventurous ruling. In an extended discussion, the circuit
court made it pointedly clear that the district court's reliance upon the initial mandate of Brady itself was in the present era entirely misplaced:
The result of the progression from Brady to Agurs and Bagley is that the
nature of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose has shifted .... Although many cases continue to use the phrase "Brady material" to mean all
exculpatory evidence and the phrase "Giglio material" to mean all impeachment evidence, these characterizations
no longer have such broad meaning
3
after Agurs and Bagley. 1
The circuit court explained the critical difference as one that shifted the
locus of the Brady rule from the pre-trial to the post-trial setting:
Although the government's obligations under Brady may be thought of as
a constitutional duty arising before or during the trial of a defendant, the
scope of the government's constitutional duty-and, concomitantly, the
scope of a defendant's constitutional right-is ultimately defined retrospectively, by reference to the likely effect that
the suppression of particular
38
evidence had on the outcome of the trial.
The court then summarized its position thusly: "An assessment of whether
an outcome would have been different if undisclosed evidence had been
disclosed is best made after a trial is concluded." 3 9
The immediate consequence of a ruling like Coppa is obvious: district
court judges are on notice that they are not empowered to order fair and
timely disclosure, and prosecutors are assured that they have no actual duty
to disclose anything prior to trial. The more extended consequences are
equally severe, as the Second Circuit itself has realized in subsequent cases.
For example, in the more recent case of United States v. Rivas, 40 a government cooperating witness perjured himself regarding a meeting and critical
conversation he had with the prosecutor immediately prior to trial. In that
conversation the witness revealed to the prosecutor that it was he, and not
the defendant, who had brought the pertinent package of drugs on board
a ship. The witness denied the meeting on the stand and the prosecutor
in turn did not disclose to the court either the meeting or the statement.
The defense found out about the meeting only after the defendant had
been convicted through a court interpreter who was troubled by the apparent perjury and nondisclosure. When confronted by the defense with this
nondisclosure, the government prosecutors responded with a letter stating

137 Id.at 142.
138 Id.at 14o.
139 Id.at 143.
140 United States v. Rivas, 377 F3d 195 (2d Cir. 2004).
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that they had failed to disclose the statement "for sound tactical reasons"
prior statement "at the last minute ... might
and that exposing the witness's
4
well have confused him."' '
The trial court judge actually accepted this rather implausible explanation by the government lawyers, but the Second Circuit was not prepared
to go that far. The court began its discussion by saying "we note with some
dismay the prosecutor's failure during the trial to correct the falsity of [the
witness'] testimony."' 42 The court then quickly moved away from the matters of the actual perjury and the prosecutor's apparently brazen duplicity
to conclude that the prosecutors' defense of their conduct was "totally un43
acceptable" and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial.'
Surely the most telling example of the adverse cultural impact the
Brady doctrine is having in jurisdictions like the Second Circuit has come
even more recently in a long, scathing opinion by another district court
judge which reversed a conviction he found to be based upon "rampant
perjury," perhaps "deliberately elicited" by federal prosecutors.' 44 In United
States v. D'Angelo, the defendant was tried for a gang murder before District
Court Judge John Gleeson. 's The government case was based upon the
testimony of three accomplice witnesses. At the conclusion of the evidentiary stage, the defendant made a standard motion to dismiss based upon
the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. Judge Gleeson reserved decision
on that motion because he had already become convinced that the testimony of the three government witnesses was "patently incredible."'46 The
jury, however, found the defendant guilty of murder. Judge Gleeson then
took up the reserved motion for dismissal. Prompted to conduct a post-trial
review of the accomplice testimony, the government shortly conceded that
all three of its primary witnesses had indeed committed perjury at trial.
"Yet despite this rampant perjury, the government clings to the jury's verdict like it is the only conviction it ever obtained....
The judge conducted an extensive review of the evidence and concluded that the trial verdict was a "miscarriage of justice."'4s He granted
the motion to dismiss but he also addressed his "concern that perjury was

141 Id. at 198.

Id. at i99.
143 Id.at 2oo.
142

144 United States v. D'Angelo, No. o2 CR

3 9 9 (JG),

2oo4 WL 315237, at *16, *23

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004).
145 Judge Gleeson had previously been the chief of the Criminal Division in the U.S.
Attorney's Office in that district, the Eastern District of New York. Disclosure: the author
served briefly as a special assistant U.S. attorney while Judge Gleeson was the chief of that

office.
146 D'Angdo, 2oo4 WL 315237, at *15.
147 Id. at *16.
148 Id. at *15.
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deliberately elicited." 49 He ultimately concluded that he did not have to
resolve that concern because it was not a finding essential to his ruling,'50
but he nonetheless reviewed and denounced the government's arguments
proffered in defense of its conduct. He found the government's arguments
to be "utterly disingenuous" and "frivolous."'' Yet the most telling insight
of Judge Gleeson's came with regard to his expressed exasperation with the
looking-glass logic of the prosecutors, who resolutely maintained that there
had been no foul because there had been no "material" harm. "At bottom,
the government's position is that the prosecutors in the case
52 still believe
D'Angelo is guilty, and therefore the verdict should stand."1

II.

BRADY ABROAD

The status of the Brady doctrine as an icon of adversarial fair play rested
largely, if not entirely, on the fact that it stood alone. There were no rules of
exculpatory disclosure in any other system, either national or international.
In the theoretically "transparent" process of the civil law countries, there is
no formal issue of disclosure: the judiciary assumes responsibility for conducting a criminal investigation and both sides are deemed to have equal
access to the investigative case file, or dossier. s3 But the need for a rule specifically targeting the disclosure of exculpatory information had not been
recognized in any of the foreign common law or adversarial systems. That
situation has changed abruptly in the past decade. There is now a broad set
of "Brady rules" in foreign adversarial jurisdictions which have transformed
the template for the duty of such disclosures. In this Part, the dramatic
and now transformative developments in both England and Canada will be
examined. The next Part will review the same developments taking place
at the international human-rights level. The most telling point of all these
developments is their unqualified rejection of the core principles of the
Supreme Court's Brady doctrine described above.
A. England
The quintessentially American saga of the corrupt conviction of Tom
Mooney, which ultimately provided the impetus for the Brady doctrine,
recently found its counterpart in England. Her name was Judith Theresa
149 Id. at *23.
150 See id.at *31

n.27.

151 Id. at *23 n.20, *24.

Id. at *16.
153 "Where, in some European countries, the police are supposed to be investigators for
both prosecution and defence, everyone works from the same file." JENNY McEwAN, EVIDENCE
AND THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS: THE MODERN LAW 285 (2d ed. 1998).
152

2005-
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Ward. Like Mooney, Ward proudly (although falsely) popularized herself
with the police as an itinerant Irish radical very much at the center of a wave
of violent protests, including several murderous bombings popularly attributed to Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists. Also like Mooney, Ward
was eventually convicted of several murders in a severely compromised
prosecution and served an extended sentence in jail, in her case eighteen
years, before her conviction was quashed by an appellate court. The 1992
reversal in R v. Ward 54 became the iconic moment in a "miscarriages of
justice" scandal that had been simmering since the late 197Os. The scandal
set off a series of reforms of the law of exculpatory disclosure in England
and, as shall be seen in the next Part, several international venues as well.
While this story of scandal and reform is both complex and compelling in
its own right, it will serve here with a singular purpose: to provide a striking
comparative demonstration of the fact that the presence of an essentially
adversarial system of criminal justice provides no meaningful justification
for the thoroughly compromised rule of prosecutorial disclosure exhibited
in the Brady doctrine.
England had vanquished its own hobgoblins of adversarial criminal
discovery by the defendant roughly a full century before American juris-55
dictions began to recognize even limited rights of criminal discovery.
Prior to the 1970s, when the particular matter of exculpatory disclosure
first emerged as a major issue of legal scandal and reform, it had been the
long-established practice in English criminal courts for the prosecution to6
disclose to the defense all of the evidence it intended to proffer at trial.'
But this discovery practice did not include a routine protocol for disclosure
of the material the prosecution did not intend to use at trial, what is now referred to in English legal parlance as "unused" material.' s2 Beginning with
R v. Bryant's8 in 1946, there was a recognition of a presumptive "duty" on
the part of the prosecution to disclose either the names or the statements
of unused witnesses who might provide exonerating information, but there
was no positive or enforceable practice of such disclosure. Why was this
so? "The answer seems to be that as a general rule trials were heard in a

154 R v. Ward, (1993) 96 Crim. App. I (Eng.).
155 To be sure, the English law of disclosure of the early nineteenth century reflected a
presumption against discovery by the criminal defendant similar to its American counterpart.
"The principal reason for this was the fear that if accused persons knew the nature of the
evidence against them, they would be tempted to tamper with, or falsify, such evidence or
intimidate those who would be called to give the evidence." JOHN NIBLETr, DISCLOSURE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 32-33 (1997).
156 Id. at 34.
157 See infra text accompanying note 165.
158 R v. Bryant, (1946) 31 Crim. App. 146 (Eng.).
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climate of trust that the prosecution would do what was fair and just and
make proper disclosure."'" 9
So at the point beginning in the late 1970s when England became suddenly overwhelmed with evidence that the prosecution could not be so
trusted, the law there was not unlike the law here: there was a largely hortatory declaration of a duty of exculpatory disclosure that relied heavily upon
the individualized discretion of the trial prosecutor, yet there was very little
in the way of a positively regulated regime of actual pretrial disclosure. The
forthright manner in which the English legal system recognized and responded to its own crisis of prosecutorial nondisclosures therefore provides
a particularly telling point of comparison to our own muddled and unsuccessful set of responses in the Brady case law.
The point here is certainly not to present the multistage unfolding of
the English rule of exculpatory disclosure as either an actual or ideal solution to the problems with the Brady doctrine.' 60The argument here does
not, and could not, suggest a simple transplant of the English rule to the
American constitutional corpus. 6'The development of an English rule of
law has been rapid, complex,
discontinuous,162incomplete, idiosyncratic and,
• .
for the moment, still unsatisfactory to many. The point is rather that in an
adversarial setting which, despite its many differences, is in its most pertinent aspects very similar to our own, the English have struggled within a
turbulent twenty-year period to construct a law of exculpatory disclosure
that now surpasses our Brady doctrine in almost every respect. The English
rule has developed rapidly in a series of overlapping stages involving multiple branches of government and it does not submit readily to any simplified linear tracking. But, it is possible to at least identify the major stages of
development while focusing on the extraordinary narrative of the singular
contributions of England's judicial counterpart to our own high court.
i. The DiscretionaryStage. -The matter of exculpatory disclosure was very
much a sleeping issue in England until the late 1970s. In that era, two separate strains on the English criminal justice system developed. The first involved a series of murderous bombings in England committed in 1973 and
159 NIBLETT, supra note

155, at 61.
i6o Indeed, several members of the present Supreme Court, particularly Justice Scalia,
have expressed grave reservations about learning anything meaningful from "the so-called
international community." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 662 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But
see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a ComparativePerspective in
ConstitutionalAdjudicafion, 22 YALE L. & PoL'y REV. 329 (2004). For a collection of recent cases
where the Court has consulted foreign law, see Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in
a GlobalAge, 117 HAav. L. REV. 2570, 2571 n.8 (2o04) (book review).
161 See generally Daniel Berkowitz, et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163
(2003); Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMp. L. 335 (1996).
162 See generally Joyce Plotnikoff& Richard Woolfson, 'A FairBalance'? Evaluation ofthe
Operationof Disclosure Law,Home Office Occasional Paper No. 76 (2001).
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1974 which led to the highly controversial investigations and convictions of
a number of alleged IRA republicans during the mid 1970s.' 63 The second
stress upon the English system came with the highly publicized reversals
of several convictions of defendants who had been wrongfully convicted
in part due to errant nondisclosures by the police and prosecution.' 64 Each
of these developments pushed the matter of exculpatory disclosure to the
forefront of concern with the state of English criminal justice.
Beginning in the early 1970s, there was a series of reform packages and
commission reports which called for greater disclosure of information helpful to the defense.165 By the late 197os, both the Home Secretary and the
Attorney General had committed themselves to satisfying the call for such
reform.' 66 This led to the adoption in December, 1981 of The AttorNey-Generals Guidelinesfor the Disclosure of "Unused Material" to the Defence.' The
Guidelines may have been an obvious attempt to preempt legislative reform
but they were nonetheless a rather remarkable set of broad self-imposed
disclosure obligations that radically transformed the prosecution practice
regarding disclosure. It was in the Guidelines that the now-prevailing term
of art "unused material" was first formalized.'16 The term has since been
given a broader interpretation,' 69 but in the original Guidelines it referred
primarily to witness statements in the possession of the police.17° Yet the
disclosure obligations attending this unused material were even in the first
instance exceptionally broad and demanding.
The Guidelines so transformed the practice of disclosure that they ultimately assumed, albeit for a brief period, the apparent force of law,' 7'
but there was never any mistaking their essentially discretionary character. Whatever first-instance interpretations were to be made of the various

163 See NIBLETT, supra note 155, at
164 Seeid. at 21-24.

17-2 1.

165 See id. at 59.

166 See DAVID

CORKER, DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 27 (1996).

167 74 Crim. App. R 302 (Eng. 1982), reprinted in NIBLETT, supra note 155, App. I

[hereinafter Guidelines].
I68 Id.,at § I.
169 See, e.g., R. v. Keane, 99 Cr. App. R. I, 5 (Eng. 1994).
170 Guidelines,supra note 167, at § I.
171 In a major, although unreported, trial court opinion, the court stated:
Now, it was initially suggested to me-though I think that there was
finally some retreat from this position-that the Attorney-General's
Guidelines do not have the force of law. I found a certain unreality in
that submission because it seems to me that any defendant must be
entitled to approach his trial on the basis that the prosecution will have
complied with the Attorney-General's Guidelines and those, accordingly, are the ground rules which govern his trial.
R v. Saunders, TR. T88163o at 7 (Cent. Crim. Ct. Sept. 29, 1989), quoted in NIBLET, supra

note 155 , at 72.
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terms and guidelines, they were to be made autonomously by the prosecutor. "The message in the Guidelines was clear-prosecuting counsel could
be trusted to do what was right and proper."' 72
The JudicialStage.-While the various voluntaristic reforms by the prosecution services were unfolding, the English courts were deciding a series
of cases that ultimately superseded the self-regulating measures of the
prosecutors. Since the late nineteenth century, English common law had
required the prosecution to disclose to the defense prior to trial the evidence it would proffer before the court.'73 But the early common law had
not directly addressed what the prosecution's disclosure obligations were
with regard to material that it did not intend to introduce at trial. In the
first direct ruling on the issue in the 1946 case of R v. Bryant, the Court of
Appeals assumed that there was such an implied "duty" on the part of the
prosecution at least with regard to witnesses whom the prosecution chose
not to call at trial. 74
This common law duty of disclosure was premised on the received understanding that the prosecutor, although an advocate and an adversary,
had a primary obligation to inform the court itself of any evidence relevant
to the matter subjudice.This became explicit in the next case on point decided by the Court of Appeal, almost twenty years after Bryant. In Dallison
v. Caffery,'75 the issue was once again not whether disclosure of witness
information provided to the police was required, but rather what form the
disclosure should take. In the course of reaffirming, and perhaps extending,
the holding of Bryant,the Court of Appeal opined:
2.

It would be highly reprehensible to conceal from the court the evidence
which such a witness can give. If the prosecuting counsel or solicitor knows,
not of a credible witness, but a witness whom he does not accept as credible, he76 should tell the defence about him so that they can call him if they
wish.

172 NIBLE'rr, supra note 155, at 69.

173
It is highly improbable that prosecuting counsel in the Crown Court
would endeavor to introduce, as part of the case for the prosecution,
evidence which had not been disclosed to the defence. In reality, it
would be a waste of time even to try as the judge would accede to the
inevitable defence application for an adjournment in order that the fresh
evidence could be considered.
Id. at 32.
174 R v. Bryant, (1946) 31 Crim. App. 146, 147 (Eng.).
175 Dallison v. Caffery, (1964) 1 Q.B. 348.
176 Id. at 369.
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The English rule therefore recognized from the outset that the public
prosecutor, as the advocate on behalf of the state, had a special obligation
to the state itself to reveal any information that bore upon the integrity and
competency of the judicial proceedings conducted by the state.
When the troubles of the 197os began to implicate the competency and
the integrity of the English criminal justice system, the English courts at
first appeared reluctant to join the fray. The IRA bombings took place in
1973 and 1974; the trials took place several years after that; the original appeals were heard, and denied, in the mid i98os; and the lid did not come
off until the cases were referred back to the Court of Appeals in the late
i98os. So in the late 197os, despite the clamors in the ranks, the courts
were still holding the line regarding their traditional laissez-faire approach
to prosecutorial disclosure. The assumption appeared to be that the center
would hold.
[TIhis possibility of the defence being deprived of relevant exculpatory
material by the prosecution was regarded as something chimerical. Lawyers
and judges alike were content to assume that such a possibility was in practice obviated by a double safeguard: the impartiality of the police and the
honourable practice of prosecuting counsel. Particular reliance was placed
on the latter....'77
The initial disclosure case law of the I98os therefore involved the straightforward application of the common law principle of "fairness" to the interpretation of the Guidelines.' T7 Yet even on this simple standard, the courts
quickly began to recognize several recurrent failures of fairness in the
Guidelines and to assert an increasing role for the courts in reviewing the
otherwise unfettered discretion of prosecutors.
In a spate of decisions, the Court of Appeal held that it had a role far greater
than that envisaged under the Guidelines; first, that of monitoring prosecution decisions as to non-disclosure, and secondly, such monitoring would
be carried out based upon what the court regarded as fair, rather than on
a narrower basis of whether or not prosecution counsel had properly exercised his discretion in accordance with the relevant sub-paragraph of [the
Guidelines].79
It was at this point, in the late i98os, that the center finally gave way.
While the Court of Appeal was gradually taking the blinds off regarding
its scrutiny of a variety of cases that appeared to suggest a systemic failure
177 CORKER, supra note 166, at 24.
178 See, e.g., R v. Liverpool Crown Court expar Roberts, [19861 Eng. Rep. 622 (Q.B.)
(duty of disclosure extends to police as agent of prosecution); R v. Paraskeva, (1982) 76 Crim.

App. 16z (Eng.) (prosecution has an affirmative duty to disclose prior convictions of prosecution witnesses).
179 See CORKER, supra note 166, at 32.
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of "fair" disclosure by the police and prosecution, several cases stemming
from the IRA bombing campaign of the early 1970S were continuing to
haunt the English criminal justice system. In the fall of 1973, when the
bombing campaign had reached the English Midlands in the form of a series of deadly explosions, the English criminal justice system went into a
campaign of its own. Several of the bombings had resulted in quick, suspect, and high-profile prosecutions which ultimately reverberated into a
nondisclosure scandal of uncommon proportions for English justice, commonly referred to as the "miscarriages of justice" scandalA' °
In February of 1974 there was a motorcoach bombing on the M62
motorway which killed twelve people. In the fall of 1974 there were two
bombings in Guildford which killed five and injured many, and also another bombing in Birmingham which killed twenty-one people.
Judith Ward was convicted of the M62 bombing. The "Guildford Four"
were convicted of the Guildford bombings. The "Maguire Seven" were
convicted of supplying the explosives for the Guildford bombings. The
"Birmingham Six" were convicted of the Birmingham homicides. All of the
defendants received substantial, in some cases life, sentences. The convictions became immediately notorious and were hotly contested, but leave
to appeal was quickly denied in each case by the Court of Appeal. Yet the
controversy surrounding these politically charged prosecutions only intensified. An extended campaign of extra-judicial review, remarkably reminiscent of the earlier American drive to "free Tom Mooney," ultimately forced
each of the cases back into the Court of Appeal for a second and, in the
case of the Birmingham Six, a third review. ""The Court of Appeal indeed
acknowledged in the latter case that the ultimate vindication of the defendants would not have occurred but for the outside campaign.
Matters would therefore have rested with the refusal of leave to appeal in
1976, had it not been for the interest taken in the case by Granada television, the publication of Chris Mullin's book Errorof Judgment in 1986, and

the support of senior churchmen and other 182
influential figures, who continued to believe in the appellant's innocence.
Beginning with the case of the Guildford Four in 1989, all four of the
IRA cases were reexamined in light of intervening "fresh evidence" that
revealed an extraordinary series of withholdings of exculpatory material.1

i8o NIBLErT, supra note 155, at 16.
18I The Court of Appeal, upon referral by the Home Secretary, reviewed the case of the
Birmingham Six in 1988 but again denied the appeal. The Home Secretary then referred the
case back to the court in 199o for a third and successful review. See R v. McIlkenny, (1991) 93
Crim. App. 287 (Eng.).
182 Id. at 294.
183 See R v. Richardson (unreported), cited in Quentin Cowdry & Sheila Gunn, Maguire
Seven Framed,Peers Say; Guildford Pub Bombings, TIMES (London) Oct. 20, 1989 ("Guildford
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In each of the trials the defendants had been connected to one of the
bombings by evidence of either or both a confession and forensic tests of
the defendant's hands or clothing which purportedly proved recent contact
with nitroglycerine. The fresh evidence generated outside the legal system
revealed that the police had withheld information casting doubt on the reliability of the confessions, and both the forensic experts and the prosecutors
had withheld evidence undermining the forensics. In the end, each of the
defendants in each of the cases was freed after having served an extended,
and in some cases the entire, sentence. Although Judith Ward had been the
first to be convicted, she was the last to be freed. By the time the Court of
Appeal exposed her story as that of a hapless, mentally infirm young woman who had been shabbily exploited by an opportunistic prosecution, the
English authorities had already entered upon the "darkest hours of British
criminal justice " 's4 as a result of the three earlier reversals. "The results of
these cases, and the surrounding publicity, had a devastating effect on the
reputation of the legal establishment and severely dented the confidence
of the general public in the police and prosecuting authorities."'
Yet the scandal of the nondisclosures did not-reach its apex until the
case of Judith Ward was decided by the Court of Appeal in June 1992. If
the three earlier IRA reversals had brought public disrepute upon the system of criminal justice, the Ward case produced "something akin to panic
within the ranks"
of English police and prosecutors. The earlier cases
had each found serious fault with the system that created and concealed
the injustice of nondisclosure, but they were each careful to fold the finger
of blame regarding the individual responsibility for each such miscarriage.
Not so the opinion in Ward. Lord Justice Glidewell issued an extended
and virtually unprecedented judicial acknowledgment of endemic criminal injustice. The opinion became both the capstone to the scandal of the
IRA cases and the foundation for the next generation of disclosure law in
England, and as shall be seen in the next Part, in the international arena
as well.
In September of 1973, a bomb exploded at Euston station. Many people were injured, but there were no fatalities. In February of 1974, a bomb
exploded on a coach carrying military personnel and their families on the
M62 motorway. Twelve people were killed, including several children. Several weeks later, another bomb exploded at the National Defence College
Four"); R v. Ward, (1993) 96 Crim. App. I (Eng.); R v. Maguire, (1992)94 Crim. App. 133 (Eng.)
("Maguire Seven"); R v. Mcllkenny, (991) 93 Crim. App. 287 (Eng.) ("Birmingham Six").
184 Patrick O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure:Principle,Practice andJustice, in JUSTICE IN
ERROR 101, 104 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1993).
185 NiBLETT, supra note 155, at 17.
186 Plotnikoff & Woolfson, supra note 162, at 2 (quoting David Calvert Smith, The
ProsecutingAuthority's Role, Disclosure under the CPIA 1996: British Academy of Forensic
Sciences Seminar (Dec. I, 1999)).
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in Buckinghamshire, injuring a number of people. Several days after the
Defence College bombing, a twenty-five-year-old woman by the name of
Judith Ward was picked up for vagrancy on the streets of Liverpool. She
immediately claimed membership in the IRA and entered into a series of
interviews and admissions that extended over a period of weeks. ' She
managed to implicate herself in each of the foregoing bombings. Nine
months later, in November, 1974, she was convicted of twelve counts of
murder and three counts of causing an explosion. The case against her with
regard to each of the bombings was based primarily upon her admissions
and the same type of forensic evidence used in the other IRA cases to connect her or her belongings to possession of nitroglycerine. She was the only
person tried and convicted for each of these bombings. She received a life
sentence on each of the twelve counts of murder, and she did not file leave
to appeal.
Judith Ward spent the next seventeen years in prison without any review of her conviction. But the integrity, or "safety"1 8 of her conviction
had been clearly compromised by the ultimate reversals of the convictions
in the three other IRA cases. In September, i991, the attorney general
sua sponte referred her conviction for review by the Court of Appeal. The
Court itself took fresh evidence from sixteen witnesses over the course of a
nine-day hearing. The Court appeared moved, if not indeed overwhelmed,
by the manifold disclosures which came to light in this belated post-conviction review. "This was and is a most extraordinary case,"' intoned the
Court, which thereupon issued an equally extraordinary opinion that resonated throughout Europe, the Commonwealth countries, and international
tribunals, even though it was given no sounding in America.
The opinion in Wardis not an easy read. It is exceptionally long, recitative, prolix, and circuitous, but it makes its point: Judith Ward was the hapless victim of a criminal justice apparatus that had willfully failed the cause
in almost every essential aspect. The opinion portrayed the entire cast of
the prosecution-police, prosecutors, forensic experts, psychiatrists-as
having succumbed to the adversarial zeal of producing a conviction. The
Court found that at virtually every turn of the investigation and prosecution of Judith Ward, the public servants or agencies responsible for preparing her case had failed to disclose critical information that might well have
prevented her conviction.

187 One of the more benign ironies of this case is that, in making a series of fanciful
claims and confessions to the police, Ward managed to implicate, falsely, a fellow by the name
of "Joe Mooney." Ward,96 Crim. App. at 36-37.
188 The standard of appellate review in England requires the Court of Appeal to reverse
a conviction when it determines that a conviction is "unsafe." See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995,
c. 35, § 2(i) (Eng.).
189 Ward, 96 Crim. App. at 66.
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The Ward opinion provides a sharp and telling contrast to typical American court opinions, especially those of the Supreme Court, in its reaction
to the revelation of deliberate nondisclosure by public officials. The Supreme Court's Brady doctrine has rendered the wilfulness, and even the
lawfulness, of such prosecutorial misconduct to be something with which
judges "need not concern [them)selves."' As previously seen, even in
cases where exculpatory evidence is withheld and two federal prosecutors
file sworn statements contradicting one another as to who bore responsibility for the failure, the Supreme Court quickly blinks at the accountability
issue and moves on to a more vigorous scrutiny of the controlling issue of
whether the defendant has sufficiently demonstrated the "materiality" of
the nondisclosure misconduct.'9' To the contrary, the English Court of Appeal made attribution and accountability the essential order of its opinion.
Despite the then-nascent state of the law of disclosure in England, the
Court treated the principles of disclosure as at least self-evident, if not settled, and spent most of its time unpacking the long, twisted tale of Judith
Ward's attempts to get herself arrested and the cynical exploitation of those
public officials and servants, who were carefully named, who took advantage of her mental disarray to "solve" a notorious domestic offense.
The Ward Court began its opinion with an extended recitation of its
own de novo factfinding. It even offered an introductory biographic section
captioned "Judith Ward's life and activities before September 10, 1973,"
the date of the first bombing, at the Euston station, for which Ward was
convicted. The opinion portrayed the young Ward as a troubled and aspiring victim who repeatedly failed to secure her calamity with the police.
In one of her more innocuous run-ins with the police, when she was then
twenty-three years old, she reported herself as a highly vulnerable waif of
fourteen named "Teresa O'Connell" who appeared to be endlessly dependent upon the kindness of strangers. "It was a graphic story, almost every
word of which was fiction." 92 Several months later she surrendered herself
for going AWOL from her enlisted military service. She promptly identified herself as a lieutenant in the IRA who had helped "to blow places up
and things like that," but the private who interviewed her reported that
she "did not take much notice" of Ward's claims.' 93 In early 1973, she volunteered to the police a series of claims involving her role in a variety of
IRA affairs. The detective who interviewed her wrote it off as "total nonsense."' 94 Yet this was the same Judith Ward who was convicted several

19o Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
191 Seesupra text accompanying notes 71-72.
192 Ward,96 Crim. App. at 58.
193 Id. at 4.
194 Id. at 33.
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months thereafter of being a principal terrorist in the midland IRA bombings-based largely upon her own extended admissions.
The jury at Ward's trial did not get to know the Judith Ward depicted
in the Court of Appeals opinion because the various police reports in both
England and Ireland recounting her compulsion for making self-inculpatory statements were never disclosed. The Court referred to these failures
of disclosure as "the most substantial"' 95 nondisclosures simply in terms of
their number. "The principal relevance of the statements in question lies
in their bearing on the appellant's proclivities for attention-seeking, fantasy
and the making and withdrawal of untrue confessions." '96 With regard to
Ward's positive right to disclosure of her own many statements to the police,
the Court referred to this as "merely aspects of the defendant's elementary
common law right to a fair trial which depends upon the observance by the
prosecution, no less than the court, of the rules of natural justice. No authority is needed for this proposition ... ."'9 This simple description of the
defendant's entitlement to transparently exculpatory information as virtually primordial in character is also in telling contrast to the compromised
and complex descriptions of the right in the Brady line of cases. Here the
Court of Appeal made it perfectly plain that the prosecution-as-adversary is
entitled to no privileges of nondisclosure but rather bears an equal public
responsibility with the court to ensure the defendant a fair trial.
The Ward court went even further in its condemnation of the adversarial practices of the prosecution's forensic experts. Here the Court all but
accused three senior forensic experts of engaging in criminal conduct in
pursuit of their adversarial zeal to convict Judith Ward. After having first
declared the experts retained by the prosecution to be part of the "prosecution" itself for purposes of the right of disclosure, the Court found
the failure of the experts to disclose a series of forensic omissions and misrepresentations to itself be an egregious and independent violation of the
defendant's right.
Three senior R.A.R.D.E. [a forensic lab] scientists took the law into their
own hands, and concealed from the prosecution, the defence and the court,
matters which might have changed the course of the trial.... It is in our
judgment also a necessary inference that the three senior R.A.R.D.E.
foren99
sic scientists acted in concert in withholding material evidence.'
Further, rather than attempting to find some manner of excusing or privileging the adversarial partisanship of the forensic scientists, the Court de-

195 Id. at 23.
196 Id. at 29.
197 Id. at 25.
198 Id. at 23.
199 Id. at 51.
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livered an extended analysis and rebuke of those very partisan tendencies.
For the future it is important to consider why scientists acted as they
did.... The very fact that the police seek their assistance may create a relationship between the police and the forensic scientists. And the adversarial
character of the proceedings tend to promote this process.... They misled
both the prosecution and the defence in order to promote a cause which
they had made their own, namely that Miss Ward had been in contact with
2W

NG.

The Court of Appeal clearly did not ignore the "adversarial character of the
proceedings ' ' 20, but rather used it as the platform for analyzing the real call
of English criminal justice regarding unused material. The wide-ranging
opinion in Ward ultimately settled and transformed the common law of
disclosure in several critical respects, all of which are the more remarkable
for their utter disdain of the blinking and hedging so common to the Brady
line of opinions.
There are three major accomplishments of Ward worth noting here.
The first is the broad characterization of the public officials and agencies
who shall bear and share the burden of disclosure. The Court of Appeal did
not adopt the American view of the duty of disclosure as a matter of adversarial discovery limited to what the prosecutor actually knew or reasonably
should have known under the circumstances. The Ward court included all
public officials and agencies responsible for some aspect of the investigation and prosecution of a case in its definition of "the prosecution." The
court identified four separate categories of public agents who were directly
responsible for the disclosure of information material to the defense: (i)
the three separate police forces that worked on the case, (2) the entire staff
of the prosecution office, (3) the prosecution psychiatrists;,and (4) the prosecution forensic scientists. °2 The court then devoted a separate section to
each of the four groups, in which each was found to have failed its individual and positive responsibilities for disclosure. The court therefore made
it clear throughout its opinion that the duty of disclosure was triggered not
just by the adversarial responsibilities and demands of discovery but rather
by the more fundamental imperatives of public accountability.
The court also settled upon a standard of materiality that surpasses its
American counterpart in both principle and scope. It will be recalled that
the Brady standard of materiality is limited to evidence which, at the point
of post-trial review, "probably would have resulted in acquittal."203 The

2oo Id. at 51-52.
201 Id. at 51.
202

Id. at 23.

203 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,

I (1976).
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Brady standard is therefore not so much a standard of material evidence as
it is a standard of material, or reversible, error. The Ward court approached
the issue as one driven by the simple principle of fairness to the accused at
the point of indictment. It therefore carefully distinguished between material evidence and material error, and made it plain that the duty of disclosure
had a principled application only to the former.
The obligation to disclose only arises in relation to evidence which is or may
be material in relation to the issues which are expected to arise, or which
unexpectedly do arise, in the course of the trial. If the evidence is or may be
material in this sense, then its non-disclosure is likely to constitute a material irregularity.Z04
The Court of Appeal then proceeded to make clear that it was entirely inappropriate for a prosecutor to measure the duty to disclose material
evidence by the likelihood that nondisclosure will ultimately constitute a
material error. One Mr. Langdale presented the appeal for the government,
and at several points he conceded the nondisclosure of material evidence
but argued that the error itself was not material. The court conceded the
distinction but went on to caution against confusing the principle with the
exception.
We would emphasize, however, that the scope for the application of Mr.
Langdale's proposition is limited to matters which, at the end of the day,
can be seen to have been of no real significance. The possibility that this
view will ultimately be taken of any particular piece of disclosable evidence should be wholly excluded from the minds of the prosecution when
the question of disclosure is being considered. Non-disclosure is a potent
source of injustice and even with the benefit of hindsight, it will often be
difficult to say whether or not an undisclosed item of evidence might have
shifted the balance or opened up a new line of defense.205
This is of course in sharp contrast to the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Ruiz where the Court insisted that only with "the benefit of hindsight" could the measure of materiality be taken. The Ward court appeared
so intent on cementing this understanding of the duty of disclosure as a
prospective, pretrialobligation of the prosecution that it returned to it on
several occasions.
"Material evidence" means evidence which tends either to weaken the
2o6
prosecution case or to strengthen the defence case.

2o4 Ward, 96 Crim. App. at 22.
205 Id.
2o6 Id. at 56.
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We would emphasize that "all relevant evidence of help to the accused" is
not limited to evidence which will obviously advance the accused's case. It
is of help to the accused to have the opportunity of considering all the material evidence which the prosecution have gathered, and from which the
207
prosecution have made their own selection of evidence to be led.
28

It extends to anything which may arguably assist the defence.' °

In its analysis of the failure to disclose scientific evidence to the defense, the Ward court provided a compelling illustration of the inherently
prospective quality of material evidence.
It is necessary to consider the impact of the legal rules governing the disclosure by the prosecution of material scientific evidence. An incident of
a defendant's right to a fair trial is a right to timely disclosure by the prosecution of all material matters which affect the scientific case relied on by
the prosecution, that is, whether such matters strengthen or weaken the
prosecution case or assist the defence case. This duty exists whether or not
a specific request for disclosure of details of scientific evidence is made by
the defence. Moreover, this duty is continuous: it applies not only in the
pre-trial period but also throughout the trial. The materiality of evidence on
the scientific side of a case may sometimes be overlooked before a trial. If
must
the significance of the evidence becomes clear
2 9 during the trial there
be an immediate disclosure to the defence.
The third major accomplishment of Wardwas to bring to a close the traditional privilege of prosecutorial discretion in matters of disclosure. Once
again the court found a review of the "adversarial character of the proceedings' ' 10to provide good reason to remove rather than to sustain the privilege. The court found the self-regulating posture of the prosecution to be
incompatible with the "positive"",. duty of disclosure now being imposed
upon it. The court also found the manifold failures of disclosure in this
very case to be ample evidence of the dissonance between the duty and
the discretion of the prosecution. In reference to the argument regarding
the positive nature of this duty made by one Mr. Mansfield, counsel for the
defense, the court responded as follows:
Mr. Mansfield's position was simple and readily comprehensible. He submitted that there was such a duty, and that it admitted of no qualification
or exception. Moreover, he contended that it would be incompatible with a

Id. at 25.
2o8 Id. at 52.
209 Id. at 50-5 i.
210 Id. at 5i.
211 Id. at i.
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defendant's absolute right to a fair trial to allow the prosecution, who occupy
an adversarial position in criminal proceedings, to be judge in their own
cause on the asserted claim to immunity.... We are fully persuaded by Mr.
Mansfield's reasoning on this point. It seems to us that he was right to remind us that when the prosecution acted as judge in their own cause on the
issue of public interest immunity in this case they committed a significant
number of errors which affected the fairness of the proceedings. These considerations therefore powerfully reinforce the view that it would be wrong
to allow the prosecution to withhold material documents without giving any
notice of that fact to the defence. 22
This passage certainly reflects a superior understanding of the essential
checks and balances that both distinguish and safeguard the competitive
enterprise of an adversarial system, for here the Court of Appeals recognizes that the inherent tendencies of such a system, in which the market
of information is not an open one, contradict an unregulated privilege in
the hands of law enforcement officials. 2 3 No mechanism to check or balance the competitive advantages of secrecy held by the prosecution can
be made operable without a triggering mechanism that is itself dependent
upon a certain measure of disclosure. The Ward opinion therefore repudiates the laissez-faire tradition of the Brady doctrine in a most fundamental
sense. It forcefully articulates a recognition that fundamental fairness is a
preemptive state responsibility and not a negotiable characteristic of the
competitive exercise. In turn, it provides a compelling account of the need
to set a principled check on the ability of the prosecution to abuse this
power rather than to rely upon the market of criminal justice to "balance" 2 ' 4
the privileges of the defendant with those of the prosecution.
Ward was certainly a "watershed," 2 1 "landmark, 2 , 6 decision in English law. It contained a series of both factual findings and legal conclusions
which firmly stamped the evolving judicial response to the scandals of nondisclosure. It was in the ordinary course followed by a handful of cases
which served both to affirm and to modify the broad holdings of Ward.2

212

Id. at 57.

213 In a subsequent case, the Court of Appeal stated this point even more succinctly:

"[I1n our adversarial system, in which the police and prosecution control the investigatory
process, an accused's right to fair disclosure is an inseparable part of his right to a fair trial." R
v.Brown, [19951 1 Crim. App. 191, 198 (Eng.).
214 Ward,96 Crim. App. at 22.
215 NIBLETr, supra note 155, at 3.
2 16 CORKER, supra note 166, at 36.
217 See, e.g., R v. Blackledge, [1996] Crim. App. 326 (Eng.) (reverses conviction based
upon plea of guilty where material information not provided to defendant prior to plea); R v.
Brown, [1995] Crim. App. 191 (Eng.) (Warddoes not require pretrial disclosure of prior convictions of defense witnesses); R v.Keane, [1994] 99 Crim. App. i (Eng.) (providing very broad
restatement of standard of materiality); R v. Davis, Johnson and Rowe, [1993] 97 Crim. App.
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The case law sponsored an ambitious solution that extended well beyond
the simple Brady paradigm regarding the disclosure of explicitly exculpatory material. The English Court of Appeal adopted a "general principle
of open justice" which required the government to disclose whatever
information it possessed that was "material" in the sense that it could be
deemed:
(i) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case;
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent
from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use;
(3) to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a lead on
(2).219
evidence which goes to (i) or
Yet it is also true that the high-water status of Wardwas relatively short
lived. However solidly grounded it was in notions of due process and fundamental fairness, in English law Ward had the status of only a commonlaw opinion. The English doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy provided
that that body was entitled to have the next, if not the last, word on the
matter. So, the matter of disclosure quickly became embroiled in the then
broader activist ambitions of the Conservative government to redraw some
of the more established ground rules of English criminal justice.
3. The Legislative Stage.-The scandals of nondisclosure had seriously
compromised the state of English criminal justice, and the widely heralded opinion in Ward served in large measure to underscore the damage. Ward was quickly followed by a period of nearly unrestricted "open
file" discovery throughout England in which "defense lawyers sometimes
bombard[ed] the prosecution with requests for thousands of documents
with little regard to their relevance." 220 The Court of Appeal itself shortly
called upon the government to conduct a thorough legislative review of the
discovery dilemma given that "the ideal solution might be a statutory statement of the duties of the Crown regarding disclosure of relevant information. 2 ' The Conservative government wasted no time with an extended
review. In 1995, the Home Office prepared a white paper entitled Disclosure: A Consultation Document, which listed seven principal problems with
the recently developed common law of disclosure.222 The following year

11o

(Eng.) (ex parte application to conceal sensitive material requires notice to defense).
218 Keane, 99 Crim. App. at i.
219

Id.at 6.
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Brown, I Crim. App. at
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Id.

222 Cm
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2864, London: HMSO, 1995, cited in NIBLETT, supra note 155, at
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the government introduced and Parliament passed
the Criminal Procedure
3
and Investigations Act of 1996 (CPIA 1996).2
The CPIA 1996 is a remarkable piece of legislation that has invited
enormous controversy and reaction among the unallied partisans of criminal justice in England.2 4 It has abruptly introduced into the English criminal justice system the already adopted concept in America of "reciprocal"
discovery. There is no question that the statute was designed to reverse
the compromise to the prosecution's status and autonomy affected by the
recent spate of Court of Appeal rulings. "The CPIA 1996 features the return of unfettered prosecution discretion in the primary disclosure stage,
a change aimed directly at the decision in Ward."2 25 Yet, in the end, this
extraordinary Conservative reaction to the progressive rulings of the courts
serves only to underscore the essential failings of the American Brady doctrine. As reactionary as the statute may be, it nonetheless recognizes and affirms an essential principle of disclosure that is still denied by our Supreme
Court. "While the CPIA 1996 has imposed many restrictions on disclosure
to the defence, it does not purport to alter the important principle that
primary disclosure should be given as early in the proceedings as practicable." 226
It would therefore appear that throughout the tumultuous period of the
IRA scandals and the contentious folding and refolding of a new national
regime of disclosure law, it has never occurred to any of the multiple parties
involved in England to suggest that the adversarial system itself mandated
a prosecutorial privilege to withhold exculpatory material subject only to
the perchance ability of the defendant, subsequent to his conviction at
trial, to demonstrate a likelihood that pretrial disclosure of the withheld
information would have altered the verdict at his trial. The entire body of
case law, the various governmental studies and reports, the prosecution's
own self-governing guidelines, as well as the CPIA 1996 all emphatically
repudiate such an empty standard.
4. Convergence: The Human Rights Stage.-England has already entered
upon its next stage in the development of a national law of prosecutorial
disclosure. Two years after enacting the CPIA 1996, England passed the
Human Rights Act (HRA i998), 22, which went into effect in October of
2ooo.The essential command of the HRA 1998 is to require English judges
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 27 (Eng.).
224 See generally Plotnikoff & Woolfson, supra note 162; SIR ROBIN AULD, REVIEW OF
THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES 28, 53 (2OOI), available at http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/auldconts.htm; JOHN ARNOLD Epp, BUILDING ON THE DECADE OF
223

DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2OOI).
225 Epp, supra note 14, at

258.

z26 Id. at 262.
227 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
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to make every effort to interpret English law to be consistent with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR).2" Article 6 of the ECHR is the basis for the European
fair-trial convention of "equality of arms." The case law of the European
Court of Human Rights has already established that the principle requires
timely pretrial disclosure to the defendant of all exculpatory material.229
Therefore, English law will likely continue on its path towards greater convergence with the equitable principles of fair disclosure already established
in European and, as will be developed in the next Part, international law.
B. Canada
During the same period in the early 1990s when the tempest of nondisclosure was raging in England, the Canadian Supreme Court quietly made
its own independent, yet compelling, contribution to the emerging law of
prosecutorial disclosure. Indeed, the exceptionally lucid and principled
discussion found in the leading Canadian case of R v. Stinchcombe2 3° has
become required reading for courts and commentators alike, and it has also
been adopted more recently by the English House of Lords. 3'
The Canadian legal system has traditionally been patterned on the
English common law adversarial system, but the Canadian criminal justice
system reflects a greater influence of the European civil law tradition. Thus,
whereas the tradition in England for over ioo years has been to provide the
defense with pretrial discovery of all evidence to be proffered at trial (the
"used" material), Canada had virtually no tradition of formal discovery by
the defense. Rather, the Canadian approach was to require the prosecutor
in the first instance, as an obligation to the court itself, to provide the tribunal with
all evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory, material to the
232
charge. The defense was thereby presumed to be a secondary beneficiary
of this primary, governmental obligation. The cases indeed required the
prosecution itself to present all exculpatory material at trial.2 33 Therefore,
until the very eve of the new era prompted by the nondisclosure scandals
in England, the only reform issue percolating in Canadian law was whether
to create an obligation on the prosecution to provide the defense with direct notice of the inculpatory evidence it intended to proffer at trial.

228 Id. at §3.
229 The seminal case is Jespers v. Belgium, App. No. 8403/78, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305, 307
(1982). See also Rowe v. United Kingdom, App. No. 289o1/95, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 2 (2000);
Edwards v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13071/87, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. 417,426(1993).
230 R v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
231 See R v. Mills, [1998] A.C. 382 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
232 SeeR v. Cook, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113.
233 See Lemay v. R, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 232, 240-41.
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The Canadian criminal justice system has undergone a significant series
of independent changes in the modern era. The creation of a prosecutorial
service, independent of the police, occurred in most of the Canadian provinces prior to the 1986 creation of the Crown Prosecutions Services (CPS)
in England. This alone generated greater attention to the professional ethics of the prosecutor as such, independent of the investigative practices of
the police. In 1985, Canada passed its own national bill of rights, which provided the Canadian Supreme Court with powers of judicial review not unlike those of our own Supreme Court3.23 These changes reflected a broader,
more fundamental concern in Canada with the nature of the modern prosecutorial role in a traditionally adversarial system. In the early 197os, the
Law Reform Commission of Canada, after conducting a broad survey of
Canadian prosecutors, sounded an early warning that "prosecutors cannot
be expected to ignore the adversary nature of their role in exercising
their
' 235
discretionary power as to whether or not to grant discovery."
The development of a new national protocol for prosecutorial disclosure
therefore arose independently of the scandals in England yet ultimately
merged with the common law resolution expressed in Ward.
Briefly, the modern common law has concluded that the accused's right to
disclosure is an inseparable part of his right to a fair trial. Fair disclosure includes early disclosure by the prosecution of its case and any unused infor6
mation that may assist the defence case or lead to new lines of inquiry.23
In Canada this common law evolution has now taken the next step in recognizing the right to disclosure as not only an inseparable part of a fair trial
but also a freestanding right independent of trial.
There were no major scandals in Canada, yet there have been a handful
of recent cases involving nondisclosures and wrongful convictions. 237 In the
very first of these cases to receive the attention of the Canadian Supreme
Court, the Court struck a resounding blow against the hobgoblins of the
premodern era of adversarial nondisclosure.
In R v. Stinchcombe, ,8 the defendant was a lawyer charged with the serious yet mundane crimes of theft, fraud, and breach of trust involving financial instruments he had held in trust for his client. At a preliminary inquiry
in the case, the Crown had taken testimony from the defendant's former
secretary which was "apparently favourable" to the defendant39 The tes234 Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C., app. III, § 2(1985).
235 LAw REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER NO. 4, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
DISCOVERY, para. 45 (1974), rprinted in LAw REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, STUDY REPORT.
DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES (1974).
236 Epp, supra note 14, at 33.
237 Steid.at 43 nn.105-o8.

238 R v. Stinchcombe, 11991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
239 Id. at 326.
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timony itself was not a matter of record in the proceeding. Subsequent to
that inquiry, the police had also taken two statements from the secretary,
once prior to and once during the actual trial. The former secretary refused
to speak to the defense prior to trial. The defense made a request for disclosure following each of the two statements but was denied. It was not
until the third day of trial that the defense learned that the prosecution
at trial on the ground that her testimony
did not intend to call the secretary
"was not worthy of credit." 240 The defendant therefore made a demand
to the court for the pretrial disclosure of the secretary's statements. Both
the trial and intermediate appellate court upheld the nondisclosure on the
broad ground that "under the circumstances" the prosecution had no obligation to call the witness and the defendant had no recognized right to
compel such disclosure. 4'
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the disclosure issue with the
understated recognition that the law in Canada up to that point was "not
settled.... No case in this court has made a comprehensive examination
of the subject."2 42 The Court, per Justice Sopinka, made quick note of the
fact that "[piroduction and discovery were foreign to the adversary process
of adjudication in its earlier history,,2 43 and then just as quickly repudiated
that history. "It is difficult to justify the position which clings to the notion
that the Crown has no legal duty to disclose all relevant information. The
arguments against the existence of such a duty are groundless while those
in favour are, in my view, overwhelming." 24"
It was at this point in the opinion that Justice Sopinka made the simple
observation that has now become the most cited passage in the burgeoning
annals of the jurisprudence of disclosure: "I would add that the fruits of the
investigation which are in the possession of counsel for the Crown are not
the property of the Crown for use in securing a conviction
245 but the property
done.
is
justice
that
ensure
to
used
be
to
public
the
of
The Court was not unaware of the traditional arguments against disclosure in an adversarial system. It responded to the well-traveled hobgoblin
that prosecutorial disclosure would provide the defense with an undue advantage to tailor its defense to the prosecution's evidence with the observation that in the modern era of adversarial justice disclosure itself had
become a normative process.246 "The principle has been accepted that the
search for truth is advanced rather than retarded by disclosure of all rel-
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244 Id.at 333.
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evant material."2 47 The Court described this historical trend as a "wholly
natural evolution of the law in favour of disclosure. 2'' as
Stinchcorabe designated a broad national standard of disclosure for Canadian prosecutors. There was a general rule of "disclosure of all relevant
information" whenever there was a "reasonable possibility" that a failure
to disclose would impair the defendant's ability to make a "full answer and
defence." ' 9 This primary concern with the functionality of disclosure also
led the Court to set a strict standard for the timing of such disclosures. Disclosure serves its mission only when it occurs prior to the point at which the
defendant is required to make informed decisions regarding his answer to
the charges. Therefore, "initial disclosure should occur before the accused
is called upon to elect the mode of trial or to plead. These are crucial steps
which the accused must take which affect his or her rights in a fundamental
way.

250

The significance of this timely disclosure provision is rather profound
for our purposes, because it reveals the Canadian Supreme Court's recognition that it is the entire criminal justice process and not just the trial process
alone that must be fair. The Brady doctrine expressly excludes from its
purview any nondisclosure by the prosecutor, however willful or unethical,
unless it affects the outcome of an actual trial. It therefore limits the due
process requirement of fair disclosure to a mere handful of criminal cases.
The Stinchcombe court, however, requires the prosecutor to maintain a fair
and ethical standard throughout the criminal process in all cases, regardless
of whether the defendant chooses to plead guilty or otherwise independently manages to uncover the nondisclosure by the prosecutor.
There is one passage in Stinchcombe that alone poignantly highlights the
striking contrast between the respective approaches to disclosure of the
Canadian and the American Supreme Courts. As will be recalled, the Brady
rule as developed by the Supreme Court posits that the only value regarding prosecutorial disclosure cognizant within our due process matrix is that
of a factually fair result at trial.25' If there is no trial or if there is a guilty
verdict at trial which the defendant cannot retroactively demonstrate to
be probably incorrect, then there has been no constitutional violation even
where the prosecutor has willfully, even unethically, failed to disclose clearly exculpatory information. The Brady rule therefore posits that it is only in
the post-trial setting where the courts can properly perform the trial-based
analysis required to determine due process. "An assessment of whether an
247

Id.

248

Id. at 338.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 342.

249
250

251 "[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady violation' unless the [Government's]
nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence
would have produced a different verdict." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 ( 999).
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outcome would have been different if undisclosed evidence had been disclosed is best made after a trial is concluded. 25 2
The Canadian Supreme Court in Stinchcombe flatly rejected this inverted, looking-glass logic of the Brady doctrine. The statements of the secretary that had been withheld by the prosecutor were never revealed and
were not part of the record before the high court. Therefore, the Canadian
prosecutor attempted to produce the statements before the Supreme Court
in order to demonstrate what American prosecutors are routinely permitted
to demonstrate even in a most protracted post-trial setting, namely, that the
withheld evidence would not have altered the outcome of the case. The
Canadian Supreme Court found this approach so inappropriate that it did
not even permit the prosecution to produce the statements.
During argument before this court, an application was made by the Crown
to adduce the statements and the tape as fresh evidence. This application
was rejected. The principal basis for the rejection was that at this stage it
would be impossible to determine whether5 3statements would have been
material to the defence if produced at trial.
It is therefore clear that the high courts in both England and Canada,
the two mature adversarial systems most closely resembling our own, have
each, under vastly different circumstances, arrived at the same conclusion regarding the essential logic of the Supreme Court's Brady doctrine:
it not only fails to recognize but affirmatively contravenes the principles of
natural or fundamental justice required of a modern system of adversarial
criminal justice. As shall be seen in the next Part, the modern systems of
international criminal justice agree.

III.

INTERNATIONAL BRADY

The 199os have become the decade of disclosure for international criminal
justice as well. Since Nuremberg, the template for international criminal
justice has been adversarial; there are no common law juries, but there is
always an independent office of the prosecution. "It is generally recognized
that the adversarial system is more suitable when it comes to offering protection to the rights of the accused. ' 2 4 The assumption has been that, with
regard to any tribunal convened to prosecute crimes against international
law, there would be an independent prosecutor to present the charges and
the defendant would in turn be provided with a set of adversarial rights to

In re United States v. Coppa, 267 F3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 2001).
253 Suinchcombe, 3 S.C.R. at 33!.
254 SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HuMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
(2003).
252
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16

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94

guarantee him an "equality of arms" 25 with the prosecutor. This principle
of adversarial equality has over time led to the development in international law of a widely adopted list of basic rights, located principally in Article
6
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)25
and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda2 7
mental Freedoms (ECHR). 5
Yet neither Article 14 nor Article 6, nor any of the many derivative international
human rights protocols, contains a positive right of exculpatory
d. , 258
disclosure. Also, until recently there had been no independent tribunal
of original jurisdiction convened since Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute
crimes against international law. The early 199os witnessed the creation
of two such tribunals to prosecute war crimes arising from hostilities in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). These three newly created international criminal venues
have dramatically expanded and transformed the arena of international
criminal prosecutions. Each has relied directly upon the principle of equality of arms to create a specific rule requiring early and extensive disclosure
of exculpatory material. Thus within several years of the heralded English
Court of Appeal opinion in Ward, these three tribunals have each adopted
a rule of prosecutorial disclosure that has put the Brady rule sharply at odds
with present standards of international human rights and criminal justice.
The equality-of-arms principle has served as an analogue to our principle of due process to extrapolate the specific guarantees of the broader
right to a fair trial. It has thus led to the principled development of an affirmative right of disclosure derived from the original declaration of a right
to a fair trial contained in Article io of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 2 59 This incremental, yet principled, progression has been best captured by the European Court of Human Rights in a recent case in which it
reviewed certain of the disclosure provisions of England's CPIA 1996:

255 "The principle of 'equality of arms' should ensure that the machinery of state, with
its investigative and prosecutorial strength and resources, does not prevent an accused from
learning any relevant information which may assist in establishing innocence." NIBLETr, supra
note 155, at 265.
256 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 22ooA (XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/63 16 (Dec. 16, 1966).
257 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 195o, Europ. TS. No. 5.
258 "[Olne should note that the defendants in both Nuremberg and Tokyo had no
possibility of obtaining exculpatory evidence from the Prosecutor." ZAPPAtA, supra note 254,
at 20.
259 "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. z17A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/8io (Dec. 10, 1948).
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It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings, including the elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure,

should be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the
prosecution and defence. The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity
to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party. In addition [ECHR] Article 6(I) requires
that the prosecution authorities should disclose to the defence all material
26o
evidence intheir possession for or against the.accused.
A. The Two War Crimes Tribunals
The early 199os witnessed war crime atrocities in Yugoslavia and then
Rwanda. The United Nations Security Council responded by creating the
first two international war crimes tribunals since Nuremberg and Tokyo.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created in
May of 199326' and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
z6z
followed in November, 1994. The statute creating each tribunal left to
the judges presiding over the respective tribunal the task of creating a detailed set of rules of evidence and procedure.26 The ICTY created the first
set of Rules of Procedure and Evidence in February of 1994, 264 which were
later adopted virtually in toto by the ICTR in June of 1995. The original
rules of both tribunals therefore contained the same rule, Rule 68, specifically requiring the disclosure of exculpatory material. "The Prosecutor
shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence the existence of material known to the Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt
of the accused or may affect the credibility of
6
,
prosecution evidence."2
A formative body of case law has already developed pursuant to Rule
68, almost all of it decided by trial court panels of the ICTY. Discovery
generally and of exculpatory material in particular has been a prominent
defense strategy in a number of the ICTY cases. Disclosure of exculpatory
material appears not yet to have surfaced as a matter of concern in the less
developed case law of the ICTR.
There have been two general aspects to the early Rule 68 case law of
the ICTY. The first has been to separate and identify the unique role of the
Rule 68 right of disclosure within the context of a broad set of discovery
z6o Rowe v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R.

I, 2 (2000).

z61 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
262 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. SIRES/9 5 5 (Nov. 8, 1994).
263 See S.C. Res. 827, supranote 261, art. 15; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 262, art. 14.
264 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, availableat http://www.un.orgicty/basic/rpeIT3zrev36.htm.
265 Id. at R. 68(i).
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rules and the second has been to identify the actual contours of the right
itself.Adversarial justice in the international setting, directed largely by the
principle of equality of arms, places a high premium on transparency. Rules
66 and 67 of the two tribunals provide for very broad initial discovery by
the defense, and then rather broad reciprocal discovery by the prosecution.
In order to avoid the reciprocal discovery provisions of the general discovery rules, the defense in many of the ICTY cases has bypassed Rule 66 in
favor of making a broad, open-ended motion for discovery of exculpatory
material pursuant to Rule 68. This has led to the first aspect of the case law
developments which attempted to prevent this bypass strategy by imposing an initial prima facie burden of entitlement upon the defense in order
to support a Rule 68 motion. Interestingly, the ICTY panels have employed
the equality-of-arms principle itself to defeat the bypass strategy.
[Bly expressly restricting itself to Rule 68 of the Rules, the Defence, while
requesting such broad access to Prosecution documentation, is avoiding the
reciprocal obligation which it would have pursuant to Rules 66 and 67 of
the Rules. Acceding to its request without limitations would consequently
disturb the balance of the trial, particularly since such a disclosure would
manifestly occur beyond the strict requirements of Rule 68 which requires
and not all or an entire section of
the disclosure of exculpatory "evidence"
66
the Prosecutor's documentation.'
This in itself is a notable development in the initial case law of a tribunal struggling on many fronts to create a standardized protocol of adversarial justice in a setting of extreme urgency and complexity. The tribunal
appears to have rather deftly and expeditiously retired the hobgoblin of
"open file" defense discovery that continues to haunt the Supreme Court's
development of the Brady doctrine. The Supreme Court has routinely
raised the specter of ungovernable discovery by the criminal defendant as
a ground for its crabbed approach to the disclosure of strictly exculpatory
material. 67 Yet the tribunal has expressed little difficulty in separating the
two. It therefore has been able to formulate a very broad rule of affirmative disclosure regarding the discovery of exculpatory material while at the
same time maintaining the adversarial balance intended by the rules of
general discovery.
The ICTY case law has therefore constructed a set of limitations on
Rule 68 motion practice which appear designed primarily to prevent misuse of the rule rather than to restrict what is in fact affirmatively required
of prosecutors with regard to exculpatory material. The trial court panels

266 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Sanctions for Prosecutor's Repeated Violations of Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, ' 20 (Apr. 29, 1998).
267 See supra text accompanying note 96.
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in their Rule 68 decisions acknowledge their formal "consideration" of the
prosecutor's initial affirmative obligation to search for and disclose any information that falls within the tribunal's broad purview of exculpatory ma268
terial. Once the prosecutor has affirmed compliance with that obligation,
the courts do not permit the defendant to engage in a "fishing expedition"
269
by way of broad demands for disclosure pursuant to Rule 68. In order to
overcome the prosecutor's initial declaration of compliance with the rule,
the defendant is required to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor is indeed in possession of material which qualifies as exculpatory under
the rule. 7 Where the prosecutor has complied with her pretrial obligation
to disclose but exculpatory material has nonetheless come to her attention
in a post-trial setting, the courts have adopted what is an essentially harmless error standard of review.27'
Yet even in this formative stage of constructing a Rule 68 jurisprudence,
the ICTY has managed to issue a series of declarative rulings that implicitly yet clearly reject and surpass the limitations of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in the Brady doctrine. The tribunal easily recognized that a
request by the defendant had absolutely no bearing on the prosecution's
affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory material,272 thereby repudiating the
Supreme Court's ultimately failed attempt in Agurs to create a multi-tiered
system of disclosure which was critically dependent upon the nature and
timing of a request for disclosure by the defendant.273 The ICTY courts
have also made it perfectly clear that a right of disclosure is only meaningful if it accomplishes the fundamental purpose of disclosure: to provide the
defendant with a fair opportunity to prepare and present his initial defense
to the charges. The tribunal's unqualified, and virtually unchallenged, imperative regarding the timeliness of disclosure is therefore in itself an essential repudiation of the looking-glass logic of the Brady doctrine.
The Trial Chamber strongly believes that if a rule is created and intended
to have some value, especially if it creates a right, then the remedy must be

z68 One of the early amendments to Rule 68 replaced the word "evidence" with that
of "material" to conform to the early case law which held that the rule was not limited to exculpatory information that was admissible as evidence. See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No.
IT-97-25, Decision on Motion by Prosecution to Modify Order for Compliance with Rule 68,
1 i (Nov. i, 1999).
269 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for
Disclosure of Evidence,'9 7 (June 27, 2000).
270 See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2i, Decision on the Request of the Accused
Hazim Delic Pursuant to Rule 68 for Exculpatory Information, '113 (June 24, 1997).
271 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I, Decision on Motion for Review,
20 (July
30, 2ooz).
272 See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Production of
Discovery Materials, 9147 (Jan. 27, 1997).
273 Seesupra text accompanying note 91.
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an effective one. The principle of a fair trial has the following implications
with respect to the meaning of Rule 68. First,the principle of a fair trial
requires that disclosure of exculpatory material be made in sufficient time.
Thus, if the Prosecution has the statement of a person which contains exculpatory evidence and does not intend itself to call that person as a witness,
disclosure as soon as practicably possible is a must to ensure that the Defence has an opportunity to subpoena that witness or to use that exculpatory
material during274the cross-examination of witnesses whom the Prosecution
intends to call.
The ICTY case law has also implicitly rejected the Supreme Court's
insistence in the Brady doctrine that the principle of exculpatory disclosure
applies narrowly and exclusively to its impact on the trial proceeding itself.
The tribunal has treated it as self-evident that the entire prosecution and
not just the trial itself must satisfy the standards of fairness. 2 " Therefore,
the cases have held that information which would not itself be admissible
at trial is subject to Rule 68 disclosure. 276 They have also held that even
information which was not available to the prosecution at trial but surfaced
only during the pendency of an appeal is subject to the fair trial principle
of Rule 68. 77 The tribunal, as part of its ongoing efforts to separate general discovery from exculpatory disclosure, has also explicitly set a higher
standard for the very form and detail of disclosure required in the case of
exculpatory material.27 s

274 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Motion for Relief from Rule
68 Violations by the Prosecutor and for Sanctions to be Imposed Pursuant to Rule 68bis and
Motion for Adjournment while Matters Affecting Justice and a Fair Trial can be Resolved, 'I
26 (Oct. 30, 2002).
275 "When one looks at the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR one notices that the

Chambers are generally aware of their obligation to ensure the fairness of the trial as a whole."
Goran Sluiter, InternationalCriminal Proceedings and the Protection of Human Rights, 37 NEW
ENG.

L.

REV. 935,943 (2003).

276 "The expression 'evidence' is intended to include any material which may put the
accused on notice that material exists which may assist him in his defence, and it is not limited
to material which is itself admissible in evidence." Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-9725, Decision on Motion by Prosecution to Modify Order for Compliance with Rule 68, (i I1
(Nov. 1, 1999).
277 "[Tlhe Appeals Chamber also believes that the Prosecution is under a legal obligation to continually disclose exculpatory evidence under Rule 68 in proceedings before the
Appeals Chamber. The application of Rule 68 is not confined to the trial process." Prosecutor
v. Blaskic, Case. No. IT-95-i4, Decision on the Appellant's Motions for the Production of
Material, Suspension or Extension of the Briefing Schedule, and Additional Filings, 1 32
(Sept. 26,

2000).

278 See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case. No. IT-95-i4, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Reconsideration of the Ruling to Exclude from Evidence Authentic and Exculpatory
Documentary Evidence,'] 15 (Jan. 30, 1998).
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B. The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC), established by the Rome Statute
of 1998,279 is the first permanent court of international criminal justice. It
represents the fulfillment of an ambition of the international community
that began shortly after the First World War and has persisted in fits and
starts ever since. It would be difficult to overstate the significance of the
court, both immediate and extended, to the development of a universal
protocol of criminal justice. "Nor can the exemplary role of international
courts be gainsaid; their treatment of the accused provides a model to domestic justice systems throughout the world in the respect of fundamental
human rights." The creation of the ICC has produced a merger of the
longstanding conventions of human rights with the operational practice of
a court of first instance. It is a seminal development of first magnitude.
"The Rome Statute takes
"212 the form of an international treaty, but has the
status of a constitution.
The early drafts of the Rome Treaty, written in the immediate postWardera, included the first appearance in international law of a rule of exculpatory disclosure. The initial draft of the statute, issued in May of 1993,
283
did not contain such a rule. However, several months later the first revision of the draft did contain a rule combining the disclosure of exculpatory
material with that of general discovery by the defendant: "[a]ll incriminating evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely and all exculpatory
evidence available to the prosecution prior to the commencement of the
trial shall be made available to the defence
as soon as possible and in rea"
sonable time to prepare for the defence. 28
A year later, in July 1994, there was another major reworking of the
draft statute. At this point the rule of exculpatory disclosure was separated
from the rule of general discovery and given its own independent listing.
"Exculpatory evidence that becomes available to the Procuracy prior to
the conclusion of the trial shall be made available to the defence. In case of

279 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1,July 17, 1998,37 I.L.M. 999
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
28o See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 'THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1998).
z8i William A. Schabas, Article 67: Rights of the Accused, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 846 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
282 Leila Nadya Sadat, The Legacy of the ICT" The InternationalCriminal Court, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (2oo3).
283 See U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, DraftStatutefor an InternationalCriminalCourt, Eleventh
Report ofthe Draft Codeof Crimesagainstthe PeaceandSecurity ofMankind,U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/449
(March 25, 1993) (preparedby Doudou Thiam).
284 U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an
InternationalCriminalCourt,art. 44,1 3, July 16, 1993,33 I.L.M. 253, z8I (1993).
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doubt as to the application of this paragraph or as to the admissibility of the
evidence, the Trial Chamber shall decide. ''2s
As will be recalled, shortly after the first appearance of this rule in the
drafts of the Rome Statute, the ICTY in early 1994 adopted its own Rule
68. Thereafter the experience of the tribunal with Rule 68 was reflected in
the evolving revisions to the ICC rule. Finally, the rule emerged as Section
2 of Article 67: Rights of the Accused.
In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the
Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends
to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused,
or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt
286
as to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide.
Thus it is that international law, following the disclosure scandals in
England and the extended litigation at the ICTY, now has a constitutional
law of exculpatory disclosure that will, over time, likely become the exemplar of the standard for fair and equitable disclosure not only in the international arena but also in national jurisdictions both common law and civil.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Brady doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court, has never lived up
to its billing. It begins with the right idea-fundamental fairness requires
state disclosure of exculpatory information to the criminal defendant-but
then immediately cabins and compromises that idea. The only consistent
and compelling explanation for the unprincipled reductions of the doctrine
is an unreconstructed fear of the hobgoblins of an earlier era regarding the
dangers of disclosure to overly zealous defense counsel. Brady is now best
understood as a rule of prosecutorial privilege rather than a rule of disclosure. The doctrine at present is an ill-supported house of cards which will
likely not even be able to sustain itself against the mounting challenges
developing within the lower courts as a result of increasing revelations of
prosecutorial foul play and abuse regarding such nondisclosures. But there
is now a new dimension of criticism and pressure to reform which has developed outside our legal system. The "decade of disclosure '' 287 in foreign and
international law has resulted in a Brady doctrine which now stands very
much alone in the world community regarding the essential commands of
285 U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the Commission to the GeneralAssembly on the Work of
its Forty-Sixth Session, art. 41(2), U.N. Doc. A/49/io (May 2-July 22, 1994), reprintedin [1994]
2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add. i (Part 2).
286 Rome Statute, supra note 279, art. 67,4 2.
287 See Epp, supranote 14.
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human rights and fundamental fairness. The Supreme Court should simply
abandon the looking-glass logic behind its frustrated attempts to limit the
doctrine to the post-trial setting and recognize instead that due process
must begin when the process itself begins.

